SAIL (Simplified Approach to International Law)

The 14-Point Iran-US Deal: An International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:14:31 GMT

A quick summary of this Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)’s points, with international law commentary:

1. Stop fighting forever: Both sides end the war immediately, stop attacking, and respect Lebanon’s borders

Problem: Israel is still attacking Lebanon.

Since Israel hasn’t signed this deal, it has no legal obligation to stop. The US promised Iran an outcome it can’t actually compel Israel to deliver.

Also relevant: Israel’s conduct in Lebanon is actually governed by the bilateral Israel-Lebanon ceasefire implemented on 3 June 2026, which says Israel has the right to act ‘in self-defense at any time against planned, imminent or ongoing attacks’. So it can claim self-defense and keep attacking.

So this specific MoU clause is hollow until at least one of the following happens:

(a) The binding UN Security Council resolution promised in clause 14 below imposes obligations on Israel directly;

(b) Another agreement on this specific point is signed between the US, Iran, Israel and Lebanon;

2. Respect each other’s independence: No interfering in each other’s internal affairs

This is a core international law under Article 2(7) UN Charter. Good.

3. Aim to reach a final deal within 60 days (unless both agree to extend)

The final deal will (most probably) be a legally binding treaty, but this MoU isn’t. So, if either side breaches it in the next 60 days, there’s no formal enforcement mechanism… just the threat of Iran walking away or the US resuming sanctions or strikes. It’s as fragile as their previous ceasefire deal was.

4. US lifts naval blockade within 30 days

Good. The naval blockade was legally questionable anyway (as covered in another SAIL post).

5. Strait of Hormuz reopens

Iran will let ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz for free for 60 days, get it fully back to normal within 30 days, and will later talk with Gulf countries about how to manage the Strait long-term

This doesn’t clarify anything about the legal status of the Strait, i.e., how much control Iran can have over it (I covered the issue here).Will likely be left to later negotiations.

The ‘passing for free’ part is also awkward because international law doesn’t let countries charge ships simply for passing through an international strait. This is the only part of this MoU that isn’t as international law-compliant, in my view.

6. The US and partner countries will set up at least $300 billion to help rebuild Iran

This doesn’t read as the US paying reparations under international law for invading Iran, and it’s carefully drafted to avoid those optics.

It reads more like a political inducement or economic ‘carrot’ to get Iran to sign and respect the deal.

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7. All sanctions on Iran are eventually lifted

The US agrees to eventually remove all sanctions on Iran (including UN ones) on a timeline to be worked out in the final deal.

Obama’s deal (JCPOA) only lifted nuclear-related sanctions, leaving others (e.g., missile, terrorism, human rights) in place, while Trump seems to be lifting it all (?).

Obama also put mechanics in place: a snapback mechanism letting US, UK, China, Russia, France or Germany reimpose them unilaterally within 30 days of a violation by Iran. Trump doesn’t have one yet… but might in 60 days’ time.

8. Iran won’t build nukes

Iran’s existing stockpile of enriched uranium will be diluted under international inspection. Bigger questions (like whether Iran can keep enriching uranium at all) get settled in the final deal.

This principle is recycled from Obama’s deal, but more vague… likely leaving the actual cap, percentage, and duration to be negotiated within the 60-day window.

9. Freeze things for now

Until the final deal, Iran keeps its nuclear programme as-is (no expansion), and the US won’t add new sanctions or send more troops to the region.

Typical for a temporary MoU of this nature.

10. Allow Iranian oil exports

The US will immediately let Iran export oil and related products/services again, upon signing, before any nuclear steps are verified.

Obama’s Iran deal removed oil sanctions only after Iran completed specific dismantlement steps.

11. The US will release Iran’s money

Iran can actually use its frozen funds and assets now.

Obama’s deal only unfroze Iran’s money after inspectors confirmed Iran had actually scaled back its nuclear programme.

This time, Iran gets its money back first, while the nuclear rules are still being worked out.

12. Set up a system to make sure both sides follow the deal

That will likely be some kind of political/diplomatic body (not a legal institution like a court) made up of representatives from both sides who will monitor the situation.

13. Negotiate the rest after early steps start

Israel stops war in Lebanon. US lifts the naval blockade, lets Iran export oil and unlocks Iran’s frozen funds. Iran reopens Hormuz. Then phase-two negotiations can start.

14. Final agreement gets approved through a binding UN Security Council resolution.

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Overall thoughts:

(a) The US has given far more than Iran, folks (lifted sanctions, oil export waivers, unfrozen funds, a $300 billion reconstruction plan!). In return, Iran only reaffirmed what it always said (no nuclear weapons) and possibly carries on managing the Strait as it always did. Unless the terms on Iran’s existing enriched uranium stockpile ends up stricter than what Obama secured in 2015, it’s hard to see what this war will actually have achieved for the US…

(b) This is genuine progress and a solid start, but it’s too early to get excited. The real sticking points (sanctions timeline, Iran’s enrichment rights, the future of the Strait of Hormuz), and the Israel-Lebanon situation, are still unresolved. Until those pieces fall into place, this MoU could still collapse.

(c) Largely compliant with international law. There’s been a lot of talk about international being ‘dead’, but this deal is itself an international legal text. Even in the biggest legal blunders, countries still turn back to law to structure the way out. That, for me, is something to celebrate.

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How International Law protects you (or doesn’t) at the 2026 World Cup

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 11 Jun 2026 18:51:41 GMT

The 2026 Men’s World Cup starts today!

Millions of migrant workers, fans, and journalists from at least 48 countries will be flocking to the US, Canada and Mexico in the coming weeks.

If a migrant worker is exploited, a journalist is detained, or a fan aggressively arrested (likely in the US these days), immigration lawyers are scattered across the US ready to spring into action. But can international law also protect you?

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Your best bet is consular law, not international human rights law

Imagine the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) aggressively detains you (as they often do) during a match in Houston because it suspects you’re undocumented.

ICE is a federal agency, so the US should be held responsible for ICE’s actions under international law.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) protects everyone from arbitrary detention, no matter what their immigration status is.

But it won’t help you in the US, which hasn’t accepted the procedure allowing individuals to bring complaints under it. And although it will help you if you get detained by police in Mexico or Canada, and you can file a complaint against either of them to a UN committee, that decision will be a non-binding recommendation.

The Inter-American Human Rights Commission covers human rights violations by countries in the region (including the US, Canada and Mexico) but similarly, its decisions are non-binding recommendations, not enforceable judgments.

But outside human rights, there’s the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). This gives anyone detained in a foreign country the right to contact their consulate.

It’s a binding treaty, and the US and many other countries (including yours, most likely) are parties to it. It’s your best bet.

You’ll struggle to hold FIFA accountable for anything

FIFA will not have directly done whatever happened to you… but it will have created the environment for those violations to happen in the first place. So you can go after them too, right?

Not quite.

First, there is no binding international law that directly applies to FIFA.

It’s registered as a Swiss association.

International (human rights) law doesn’t create direct binding obligations on associations. It doesn’t hold them responsible. Its focus is on states.

That means any architecture for accountability under international law, like treaty bodies, international courts, or state responsibility, can’t be used directly against FIFA.

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Second, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights do tell businesses like FIFA to stop contributing to human rights harm through their own activities. But they’re guidelines that aren’t binding law.

Third, FIFA has shielded itself from human rights accountability in the Host City Agreements it signed with the 16 individual cities where matches will be held.

Don’t get me wrong… those host agreements do say FIFA and the cities will respect human rights.

They’re also inspired by FIFA’s own Human Rights Framework that it developed following the Qatar 2022 World Cup human rights controversies. Progress!

But… take FIFA’s agreement with LA for example. Now imagine a fan gets detained by the LA police during a match.

The agreement basically says the fan would have to report their complaint through whatever grievance channel FIFA has chosen to create (if it does!), hope that FIFA investigates, and then hope that FIFA decides to act on the findings.

… Mmkay, thanks.

… And FIFA itself? Faces no consequence whatsoever. FIFA is never the subject of the complaint. It has cleverly structured the entire system so that accountability flows downward to host cities… never upward to itself.

On that cheerful note… Enjoy the games, let me know who you’re supporting in the comments! Oh, and check out some resources here:

The information provided in this SAIL post is for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should seek the advice of a qualified legal professional regarding your specific situation before taking any action.

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A Russian Drone Just Crashed in Romania. What International Law Says in 2 Minutes

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Sat, 30 May 2026 14:59:24 GMT

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Yup, Romania’s just been roped into the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.

1. Did this break international law?

Yes, almost certainly, on two separate grounds.

First, airspace sovereignty. A foreign military drone entering Romanian airspace without permission is a violation of its airspace under the 1944 Chicago Convention.

Second, the laws of warfare. Even though the conflict is between Russia and Ukraine, neither can attack the other without taking all precautions to avoid harming other countries.

2. Is Russia actually responsible?

Most probably.

Under international law, responsibility requires two things: breach (did it violate a legal obligation? I covered this above) and attribution (was this Russia’s drone?).

Putin denies that it was Russia’s drone and suggested the drone might be Ukrainian.

But Romania’s foreign minister confirmed that it was a Russian drone carrying explosives, based on forensic analysis of the wreckage.

Putin has disputed the finding and demanded access to the wreckage. It would strengthen Romania’s case to share the evidence or invite independent third-party verification, but it’s not legally required to.

3. Can Romania strike Russia back?

No.

Romania’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter requires an “armed attack”.

International law interprets that threshold as requiring scale and gravity beyond a single errant drone.

4. So what can Romania actually do?

Expel Romanian diplomats from Russia (which it has done).

Close consulates.

Demand reparations through diplomatic channels.

A bigger move: Romania is a party to the International Criminal Court and could refer the incident to the Court to the existing Ukraine situation.

It could frame it as a war crime, if it can be proven that Russia was intentionally directing attacks against Romanian civilians.

5. What can NATO do?

Romania is a NATO member. It’s considering invoking Article 4 of NATO’s treaty, which triggers formal consultations between NATO members when one of them is threatened.

But the big NATO move would be Article 5: all members will defend an attacked member (because an attack against one is an attack against all).

NATO hasn’t done this (yet?). It’s blamed Russia and condemned Russia’s move for now.

This could be because NATO doesn’t consider this to be an ‘attack’ in legal terms. It could also be because it’s reluctant to escalate this into a full-blown world war (fair enough!).

6. Now what?

These types of spill overs can happen. A Ukrainian missile struck Poland and killed two people back in 2022.

The law is clear. The solution? Make enough noise that neither Russia nor Ukraine does this again, and keep a record for the day of reckoning when the war finally ends.

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Can Your Boss Stop You From Striking? International Law Just Said No.

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Fri, 22 May 2026 07:02:06 GMT

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was asked to answer one question: Does workers’ rights to strike count as a protected right under a major international labour treaty from 1948?

Yesterday, it answered: Yes.

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What’s the back story?

The treaty in question is called Convention No. 87. It was adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO): a UN agency made up of governments, employers, and workers’ groups. Countries that sign up to it promise to protect workers’ rights to form unions and organise.

But here’s the thing: the treaty never actually says that the right to strike is protected too.

This wasn’t an accident. When governments, employers, and workers’ groups wrote the treaty, they couldn’t agree on strikes… so they left it out.

Over time, though, international labour experts started treating the right to strike as an assumed, obvious part of the deal (‘If you can organise, you can strike’). But employers eventually pushed back and said: “Wait… we never agreed to that.”

So they asked the ICJ to settle it.

What was each side arguing?

Workers’ groups said: The right to strike is so essential to the right to organise that it’s automatically included, even if the treaty doesn’t explicitly say so.

Employers’ groups said: The treaty was deliberately silent on strikes. You can’t just read in obligations that were specifically left out during negotiations. If we’d wanted strikes included, we would have said so.

Why does this matter?

Convention No. 87 is one of the most widely accepted labour treaties in the world. Chances are the country you live in has signed up to respect it.

The ICJ opinion doesn’t create the right to strike from scratch (it’s already in a major human rights treaty). But including it in Convention No. 87 is powerful because of how it gets enforced:

If you're a worker anywhere in the world and your government bans strikes, unions can now file complaints with the ILO citing this opinion… and your government faces real international pressure to back down.

So next time you go out to strike and your boss says you can’t? Check if your country is part of Convention No. 87. If it is, tell them: the ICJ said my right to strike is protected under international law.

(And drop a comment if you need a lawyer 😁)

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Does International Law Have a Place at Eurovision? (In 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 18 May 2026 06:41:29 GMT

A New York Times investigation just revealed that Israel spent at least $1 million on government-funded Eurovision campaigns between 2018-2025, with coordinated voting drives that likely influenced results.

The findings shed new light on this weekend’s Eurovision Song Contest, where Bulgaria won for the first time and Israel finished second.

The contest was overshadowed by controversy over Israel's participation despite the war in Gaza, which led to Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Iceland boycotting.

The revelations raise bigger questions:

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Does international law have a place at Eurovision?

No:

An EBU rep just said, “We’re not the United Nations”.

The contest is run by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), a Swiss-based association of broadcasting organisations.

It is nothing like the UN, the EU or NATO, which are actual international organisations dealing with international law-related issues, created by countries through agreements.

So, they’ll argue, Eurovision simply isn’t a place where questions about who’s breaking which international law really belong.

Yes:

Others will argue that in reality, Eurovision is a cultural stage for countries.

They perform under their flags, national broadcasters select national entries and governments celebrate victories (or fume over losses).

In that sense, Eurovision becomes one of the many informal channels through which countries act, react and relate to each other. It could be seen as a space for soft diplomacy.

Once you see it that way, it makes perfect sense that the contest has become a site where international law debates spill over – even though EBU says it’s apolitical.

History backs this up: The EBU itself banned Russia from participating in Eurovision 2022 following its invasion of Ukraine, to avoid “bringing the competition into disrepute” (though apparently said recently it might lift the ban.)

Do countries have a legal duty to boycott?

Many will say there’s a moral duty to stand up to bad behaviour. But is there a legal duty… and one that other European countries might have to follow in the years to come?

No:

International law has something called the duty of non-recognition – basically, a rule that says countries must not treat certain serious violations of international law as normal or legitimate (here, at Article 41(2)).

In this situation, that would normally translate into things like not giving Israel any weapons or not recognizing the way Israel divides Gazan territory.

It wouldn’t require banning Israel from Eurovision, since the contest isn’t governed by international law and a boycott wouldn’t directly change the situation on the ground.

So there is no legal requirement for any other European country to follow the lead of Ireland and its allies.

Yes:

It doesn’t really matter where or how non-recognition should be expressed.

Countries have applied their duty of non-recognition in cultural arenas before.

For example: In response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, more than 60 countries (led by the USA) refused to send athletes to the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.

Another example is the 1986 boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh by several African, Asian, and Caribbean countries, protesting the UK government’s refusal to sanction apartheid South Africa.

So, applying non-recognition logic to high-profile cultural normalisation is not unthinkable.

Allowing a country to appear, under its flag, on a high-visibility international stage can be seen as a form of recognising its ordinary standing in the world.

As all countries have a duty of non-recognition, European countries would have to uphold that in this context, too (by, for example, boycotting).

Whatever position you take, one thing is clear:

International law seeps into everyday culture and isn’t limited to hallways of the UN in Geneva or New York… It shows up in unexpected places: sequins, ballads, and televotes.

If you found this helpful, share it with someone who needs Eurovision drama explained (and subscribe for more!).

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Can International Law Stop Hantavirus? (In 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 11 May 2026 07:02:04 GMT

[The usual caveats apply: this is a simplified explainer, lawyers may disagree on several of these points, and by the time you read this, something may have already changed.]

Hantavirus has been spreading from a cruise ship that left Argentina on April 1st 2026.

The World Health Organization (WHO) says the global risk is low and it’s not another COVID-19.

But there’s no treatment or vaccine, people have died and ~30 passengers who left the ship early are being tracked across the UK, US, Canada, Netherlands, South Africa, and other countries.

So can international law actually stop something like this?

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Right now: The system is working

Hantavirus is a contained outbreak; not a pandemic. The International Health Regulations (IHR) are the rulebook on how countries handle diseases that cross borders.

It was updated and took effect in September 2025 (following COVID-19 failures).

E.g.: When the UK notified WHO on 2 May about the cruise ship, it was directly following the IHR.

One big COVID lesson: fewer people fumbling around

Under the updated IHR, countries must now create one National IHR Authority: a government office in charge of coordinating responses to cross-border health threats.

Before, during COVID-19, you had lots of departments doing their own thing and fumbling to figure out who’s in charge.

This has possibly improved coordination for hantavirus. The WHO says countries are coordinating well. Good sign.

Vaccine hoarding is supposed to be harder now

Under the updated IHR, WHO must help countries get fair access to vaccines and actively remove obstacles preventing this.

This fixes one of COVID’s biggest failures: rich countries bought up vaccines while others waited months or years.

If a hantavirus vaccine were developed, WHO would be legally required to ensure Cape Verde or South Africa (where the cruise ship stopped) get access at the same time as the UK or Switzerland.

(Of course, countries must be willing to make this happen too.)

The problem is 11 countries (including Germany, Israel, Brazil, Canada) rejected these IHR updates. So they’re not bound by the equity provisions. E.g.: If Israel develops a vaccine, it could keep it. Still, for a small outbreak like this, the system is functioning for now.

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If it became a pandemic: Different story

If hantavirus escalates to a true pandemic, different rules also kick in: the Pandemic Agreement.

The problem is that agreement can’t work yet. Countries are still negotiating the crucial part (how to share virus samples and vaccines) through 2027. Until then, it’s just paper and countries would share vaccines out of goodwill, not legal obligation.

And WHO has less power to push them because:

The US exited WHO taking ~$1 billion in funding

This forced WHO to cut 1,200 jobs (22% of staff) by June 2026.

Countries have pledged more funding to compensate, and would need to hurry if a pandemic broke out.

Argentina (where the cruise ship came from) left too

It left on 17 March 2026, just weeks before this outbreak! So it has no legal obligation to share findings or participate in the global response.

But it will keep cooperating with PAHO (WHO’s regional office for the Americas), so neighbouring countries can still share its hantavirus data with the global WHO system.

One silver lining:

The updated IHR created a new ‘pandemic emergency’ alert level that triggers stronger coordination. So at least the alarm bells would be louder.

In brief:

For this outbreak, international law is mostly doing its job. But for the next pandemic? Only if countries actually fund and use the tools they’ve built.

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Israel Stopping the Global Sumud Flotilla: An International Law Breakdown (in 4 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 04 May 2026 11:39:01 GMT

[The usual caveats apply: this is a simplified explainer, lawyers disagree on several of these points, and by the time you read this, something may have already changed.]

The Global Sumud Flotilla is a fleet of civilian ships carrying doctors, journalists, activists and politicians from 40+ countries, loaded with food, medicine and baby formula.

It has attempted multiple times to sail to Gaza and break Israel’s naval blockade, and has been intercepted (i.e. stopped, controlled, boarded, searched) by Israel every time (latest episode = April 2026.)

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PART 1: WAS ISRAEL ALLOWED TO STOP THE FLOTILLA?

Not under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

UNCLOS says that no country can board another country’s ship without permission once you’re beyond a country’s coastal waters.

That rule applies whether you’re in the open ocean or, as here, in the waters near Crete.

Israel isn’t a party to UNCLOS, but that rule is so universally practiced and accepted that it binds every country whether they’ve signed the treaty or not.

The Flotilla ships had national flags indicating they belonged to those countries (e.g., Spain, France and Italy) who were furious. Many called it an act of piracy. (Legally, piracy usually involves private actors, not state militaries, so that label is contested.)

But Israel would argue we’re looking at the wrong rulebook. UNCLOS doesn’t apply at all and wartime naval law takes over entirely, because it’s at war with Hamas and running a legal naval blockade of Gaza.

So the question is, under wartime naval law: is there actually a legal blockade? (PART 2) And even if it is… did it handle the flotilla lawfully? (PART 3) Let’s go!

PART 2: IS ISRAEL’S BLOCKADE OF GAZA LEGAL?

A naval blockade is a military operation that stops ships from reaching a coastline.

The logic is simple: if you’re at war with someone, you can cut off their supply lines by sea.

To assess if the blockade is legal, there are two questions: Did Israel have the legal right to impose a blockade to begin with? And even if yes, is it running the blockade legally?

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Did Israel have the right to impose a blockade?

This is disputed.

Blocking Gaza’s coast is using force under international law.

The only two things that can make this use of force legal are UN Security Council approval or self-defence.

The Security Council didn’t sign off on Israel’s blockade, but Israel says it’s acting in self-defense against Hamas’ October 7 and years of prior attacks.

It’s supported by one 2011 UN report saying the blockade is ‘a legitimate security measure to prevent weapons entering Gaza’.

The catch: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) said you can’t be both the occupier and claim you’re defending yourself against the people you’re occupying… and also said Gaza is occupied Palestinian territory. That contradiction is Israel’s core problem.

Even if yes, is Israel running the blockade legally?

Unlikely.

A legally-run blockade must meet five conditions: publicly declared, consistently enforced to all ships, during an inter-state war, must not starve civilians, and must allow humanitarian aid through. Miss any one and it’s illegal. The first two aren’t the main controversy. The last three are tricky for Israel.

During an inter-state war:

The 2011 UN report says Hamas functions enough like a state to trigger the laws of inter-state war. Critics reject this argument. They also say Gaza is illegally occupied by Israel and you can’t be at war with/blockade territory you occupy. No inter-state war = no blockade.

Must not starve civilians:

The UN, World Health Organization, Amnesty International and others have all said Gaza’s civilian population has faced famine conditions as a direct result of the blockade.

Starvation as a war crime is being investigated by the International Criminal Court and the UN and EU say the blockade is collective punishment (a war crime). It also feeds directly into the genocide case South Africa has brought against Israel.

Israel says the famine is fake news.

Must allow humanitarian aid through:

Israel says the flotilla was a Hamas operation, there was no humanitarian gap justifying it, and it was actually carrying drugs and condoms.

The UN Security Council and the ICJ have told Israel to stop blocking humanitarian aid.

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PART 3: DID ISRAEL LAWFULLY INTERCEPT THE FLOTILLA UNDER WARTIME NAVAL LAW?

We established in Part 1 that under UNCLOS, Israel had no right to intercept the flotilla. But even accepting the argument that wartime naval law applies instead, the conclusion’s… probably the same.

First off, under wartime naval law, if there’s no legal blockade then any interception of the flotilla is unlawful. Full stop. If that’s your position, you can stop reading and mosey on with your day (hit that ‘Like’ button first, though! 😄)

But even a legal blockade doesn’t give Israel a blank cheque! It still has to intercept correctly. That means no intercepting humanitarian ships, no harming people onboard, humane treatment of anyone detained and no intercepting from an unreasonable distance.

No intercepting humanitarian ships:

You can stop ships trying to breach your blockade, unless they’re on a humanitarian mission, in which case they’re completely exempt and can’t be touched. Israel says it isn’t humanitarian, others disagree.

No harming people onboard:

Israel says the operation was conducted peacefully and without casualties. But activists reported being subjected to extreme brutality.

Humane treatment of anyone detained:

Detainees reported Israel was violent and treated them badly. Israel says detainees were unharmed.

No intercepting from an unreasonable distance:

The law doesn’t clearly say what the appropriate distance is, but the 2011 UN report said the 2010 Mavi Marmara interception was 72 miles/133 km too far, while the 2026 interception happened at 600 miles/1111 km!

But Israel says the size of the flotilla (over 100 vessels) justified early interception for safety and security reasons.

More generally Israel also has to follow basic wartime rules like proportionality (meaning the military benefit of stopping the flotilla has to outweigh the harm caused, especially to civilians). Based on the facts, hard to say this was proportionate… but what do you think?

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In brief, my friends:

UNCLOS says no → flotilla interception already unlawful.
Wartime naval law applies → but legality of blockade is contested.
If blockade is legal → must still follow interception rules but likely didn’t → unlawful.

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Four Ways the Next UN Secretary-General Could Actually Strengthen International Law (in 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Fri, 01 May 2026 07:02:57 GMT

You’ve probably heard that campaigning is in full swing to elect the next UN Secretary-General by the end of 2026 (full process explained here).

Four candidates are in the running: Michelle Bachelet (former Chilean president), Rafael Grossi (head of the UN’s nuclear watchdog), Rebeca Grynspan (Costa Rican economist), and Macky Sall (former Senegalese president).

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Media coverage is focusing on geopolitics, regional rotation and debates on electing a female SG for the first time (all important!).

But here’s what won’t make headlines: whether the next Secretary-General (SG) will actually strengthen international law… or just keep tweeting about it.

(Yes, I’m calling it ‘tweeting’. Let me have this.)

Here are four ways a bold SG could make a difference.

SG can tell the UN Security Council: “Hey, you need to look at this.”

Article 99 of the UN Charter lets the SG bring issues to the Security Council’s attention, basically saying ‘this is a threat to peace, you need to act’.

It’s seen as confrontational (like the SG saying “I think this is urgent even if you don’t” or “you’re not doing your job properly”) and risky (overstepping into ‘political’ territory, might be ignored, and might irritate the body controlling the SG’s reappointment!).

So it’s only been used a handful of times in 80+ years…

A bold SG could put climate change, pandemics, or AI governance on the Council’s agenda, which could lead to binding resolutions. A timid one won’t.

The SG can waive immunity

UN staff can’t be arrested or prosecuted in the countries where they’re working, for anything they claim was part of their job.

The problem? Crimes like sexual abuse are not a part of their job.

But the UN must decide case-by-case whether to waive immunity… and it rarely does.

So often, accountability is limited.

The SG has the power to waive the immunity for civilian UN staff accused of serious crimes (not military peacekeepers).

A bold SG might do so.

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The SG can appoint Special Envoys

The SG can pick and create Special Envoys : high-level diplomats sent to tackle specific problems (e.g., HIV/AIDS, indigenous people, youth) or focus on specific countries/regions (e.g., Syria, Sudan, Haiti) on the SG’s behalf.

So… what about a Special Envoy of International Law?

I’m serious.

Given the state of the world, maybe we need someone who pushes compliance with International Court of Justice judgments, discourages treaty withdrawals, and nudges states to join agreements gathering dust…

Someone who can knock on doors and say “remember those rules you signed up for?”.

The SG can say ‘no’ to powerful countries

Article 100 of the UN Charter protects the SG’s independence: governments aren’t supposed to tell them how to do their job.

This is permission to be bold.

A bold SG uses the powers above despite any pressure or backlash from any government, because Article 100 says they answer only to the UN Charter, not to any government.

Conclusion

Let’s be realistic: the P5 countries (USA, UK, France, China, Russia) largely control the SG’s appointment and reappointment.

An SG who’s a little too bold probably won’t last.

But one who’s too timid won’t matter either… especially now, when the UN is struggling financially, being sidelined diplomatically, and failing to get states to take international law seriously.

We need a SG who understands the risk and takes it anyway. Because international law won’t magically strengthen itself: it needs someone willing to fight for it.

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The Strait of Hormuz II: Answering Your International Law Questions in 3 Minutes

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 20 Apr 2026 07:01:22 GMT

[The usual caveats apply: this is a simplified explainer, lawyers disagree on several of these points, and by the time you read this, something may have already changed.]

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The legal controversies around the Strait of Hormuz matter: they shape what the U.S. and Iran can demand in negotiations, what other countries can push back on, and give you the full picture of the ongoing conflict. So, let’s get into it!

What law(s) govern the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait is governed by the regime of transit passage under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), giving all ships the right to sail through it.

But Iran isn’t a party to UNCLOS, and it’s not 100% clear in international law that transit passage rules are so universal that they apply to Iran regardless.

So Iran says: this doesn’t apply to us.

(I covered this in more depth in a previous post.)

Is Iran violating countries’ freedom of navigation by closing the Strait?

Yes.

Freedom of navigation is a general principle that ships should be able to move freely.

It’s so widely accepted that it almost certainly applies to all countries, whether or not they’ve signed UNCLOS.

There are some maritime zones where restrictions apply, but completely closing an international strait like Hormuz violates this freedom (as well as transit passage rules).

So even if Iran successfully argues “UNCLOS doesn’t bind me, so the transit passage rules don’t apply”, it must still respect the freedom of navigation and let ships pass through the Strait.

People keep saying the Strait of Hormuz is part of ‘international waters’. Is it?

No.

‘International waters’ isn’t a legal term.

The closest term that exists is “high seas” – parts of the world’s oceans that no single country controls (roughly 70% of the Earth’s surface).

But the Strait of Hormuz isn’t in the high seas. It’s clearly in Iran and Oman’s territorial waters.

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Is the U.S. imposing a naval blockade on Iran lawful?

Probably not.

International law allows a country (e.g. the U.S.) to hit back when another country (e.g. Iran) breaks the rules. These are called countermeasures.

But there’s a hard limit: countermeasures can’t involve the use of force.

And parking warships outside someone’s ports to stop ships getting in or out is using force under international law.

The only two things that can make this use of force legal are UN Security Council approval or self-defence.

Neither applies here: the Security Council hasn’t signed off on it, and self-defence only kicks in if the U.S. had actually been attacked.

Most would say closing the Strait doesn’t qualify as an ‘armed attack’, though some disagree.

So the U.S. naval blockade is likely illegal.

Can other countries impacted by the U.S. blockade do anything?

Yes.

Countermeasures can’t be exercised against third parties that haven’t done anything wrong (e.g., the U.S. turning away Indian ships bound for Iran, or oil tankers serving European countries).

The U.S. could be liable to those third countries for any harm caused.

They can formally protest (e.g., summon the U.S. ambassadors) or even negotiate compensation (though getting the U.S. to actually pay up is another matter entirely…).

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Is the way the U.S. naval blockade is being carried out lawful?

Probably not.

Separate from whether the blockade should exist at all, there’s the question of how it’s being enforced. And it’s not looking great here either.

Under the international law rulebook for naval warfare, the U.S. ticks some boxes: it announced the blockade publicly and is applying it impartially to all countries’ ships.

But two problems:

First, a blockade is only a recognised legal tool during armed conflict. But there’s currently a ceasefire in place (i.e. no armed conflict), which raises the question of whether the US can legally use it at all?

Second, Iran’s coastline is 1,100 miles long, the U.S. is operating alone and has asked for help, and it seems like a massive undertaking. That raises questions about whether the blockade meets the legal requirement of effectiveness.

So… the blockade likely isn’t clearly being lawfully carried out either.

The U.S. attacked and captured an Iranian cargo ship trying to get past its blockade of Iran’s ports. Was that lawful?

If the blockade is unlawful (which is likely), neither attacking nor capturing the ship is justified.

For those who argue the blockade is lawful, then capturing it is lawful but attacking it without prior warning isn’t.

Iran wants to charge tolls for ships to pass through the Strait. Is that lawful?

Probably not, but it’s hard to enforce.

UNCLOS explicitly forbids it, but Iran isn’t a party to UNCLOS.

It’s also not 100% clear that this rule on tolls is so universally widely accepted that it applies to Iran regardless.

And unlike the Suez Canal, Panama Canal or Bosphorus, which all have/had their own specific international treaties governing passage and fees, no such treaty exists for the Strait of Hormuz.

How does this all impact the ceasefire?

It puts enormous strain on an already fragile agreement.

Neither side is fully complying: Iran is (still) closing the Strait, the U.S. is imposing a blockade, and each is accusing the other of ceasefire violations. Yikes.

It also highlights why any lasting deal has to resolve the Strait question directly.

Right now the two sides couldn’t be further apart: Iran wants full recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait, the U.S. wants a guarantee it can never be closed again.

Let’s see what happens.

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Five Reasons the US-Iran Ceasefire Is Legally Fragile (in 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:01:40 GMT

Trump announced he would pause bombing Iran for two weeks and Iran said it would open the Strait of Hormuz.

Both are gearing up for negotiations mediated by Pakistan.

But literally hours after the announcements, Israel bombed Lebanon and Iran started blocking Hormuz traffic again.

What’s going on? Beyond the obvious geopolitical tensions, this ceasefire is also legally fragile. Here’s how:

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1. The U.S./Iran haven’t committed to identical terms

The US and Iran have both publicly committed to something: a two-week pause, stopping attacks, opening the Strait of Hormuz.

But they haven’t committed to identical terms.

Compare what they actually said:

On the Strait of Hormuz, Trump said “COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING” while Iran said “safe passage via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations”. Those are two different things.

So if Iran blocks ships citing ‘technical limitations’ and the US calls it a breach, it’ll be hard to settle who’s right.

2. The ceasefire isn’t a binding treaty

The ceasefire would be binding if it were a treaty: a written agreement between states.

Instead: separate social media posts saying different things.

3. U.S./Iran haven’t made binding unilateral statements either

Fun international law fact: a country can legally bind itself just by publicly saying it will do something, as long as it intends to be bound by that statement.

But these social media posts are phrased conditionally: “I will do X if you do Y (my action depends on you)”:

The U.S.: “subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz”

Iran: “If attacks against Iran are halted, our Powerful Armed Forces will cease”

A unilateral declaration is ‘I will do X’ unconditionally.

Conditioning on the other side’s performance shows you don’t intend to be legally bound no matter what. These are political commitments, not legal obligations.

So if either side breaks its “promise,” no one can credibly say “you violated international law” because neither side actually accepted a binding legal obligation.

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4. It hasn’t defined what’s allowed in the next two weeks

Can the US resupply its military bases in Qatar?

Can Iran repair bombed power plants and weapons facilities?

Can either side move troops or bring in fresh weapons systems?

Can Israel continue its invasion of southern Lebanon?

Nobody knows, because the parties never agreed on these points.

The result is a pause that exists only as long as neither side decides to start bombing again, making the ceasefire inherently unstable.

5. There’s no ‘referee’

There’s no mechanism to determine when it’s been violated or who violated it first.

No arbitration panel. No monitoring body. No enforcement mechanism.

That means either side can claim the other broke the deal, restart hostilities, and face no consequences…

Ceasefires rely entirely on both sides’ good faith. And I suspect that’ll be in short supply after weeks of bombing each other...

Conclusion

This ‘ceasefire’ is held together by political convenience, not legal obligation. And that makes it extremely fragile.

Next: the Islamabad talks, where the US and Iranian proposals need to be hammered into a single, binding agreement.

Let’s hope for the best.

Stay tuned for more legal breakdowns right here on SAIL.

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Israel’s Occupation of Southern Lebanon: A 3-Minute International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 06 Apr 2026 07:03:11 GMT

Israel launched a ground invasion of Southern Lebanon, targeting the area from its border to the Litani River (~22 miles/35km: huge!).

A country occupies another to control territory for protection or strategic advantage.

Occupation can be lawful or unlawful depending on why and how it’s done.

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Israel’s grounds for occupation are unlawful (why it’s done)

Occupation is lawful only if it’s genuine self-defense or UN Security Council-authorised. Neither applies here cleanly.

After Khamenei’s killing, Hezbollah (Iranian-backed armed group in Lebanon) fired at Israel. Israel struck back and launched a ground invasion of Lebanon.

It’s debatable whether this is even self-defense. Here are the issues:

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(Shoutout to for the tip on presenting this table!)

But even if Israel had the right to self-defense, it violates international law by failing two tests:

Necessity: Israel could’ve simply stopped attacking Iran, and Lebanon already banned Hezbollah’s military activities.

Proportionality: A full invasion displacing hundreds of thousands is too big. Striking Hezbollah’s rocket sites or temporarily occupying a narrow border strip would be proportionate.

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Israel’s conduct of occupation is also unlawful (how it’s done)

Even a legal occupation has strict rules: keep it temporary, don’t settle your people there, make no permanent changes.

Israel is breaking all of them because it’s carrying out annexation.

That’s when you’re supposed to be ‘house-sitting’ but you either declare the ‘house’ is yours (de jure annexation), or act like it by remodeling, moving your family in, changing the locks (de facto annexation)… or both.

Israeli Minister Smotrich explicitly declared the Litani River should be Israel’s new border: de jure annexation.

Netanyahu called for a “security zone” even post-war, a policy that would prevent hundreds of thousands of displaced residents from returning home: de facto annexation — and one that has hardened into permanence before, e.g., Israel’s 1982–2000 Southern Lebanon occupation, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank.

Why this matters

The world is distracted by the Iran war and the threat of the Strait of Hormuz closing. But annexation cannot be ignored; it was a primary trigger for WW2. The international system was built specifically to prevent it.

The UN Security Council must demand Israel withdraw (it has done so in the past) and the UN General Assembly can condemn this. It could also ask the International Court of Justice for its opinion, similar to the one it gave in 2024 about Israel’s West Bank occupation.

States must refuse to recognise annexation, condition military aid accordingly, and pressure Israel to pull out.

Letting this succeed tells every territorial aggressor the rules don’t apply when the world looks away.

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NASA Just Launched Artemis II: A 2-Minute International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 02 Apr 2026 05:01:21 GMT

Did you hear? NASA’s Artemis II just launched, sending astronauts around the Moon and back for the first time in more than 50 years.

The mission, Artemis II, is taking its crew farther from Earth than any humans have ever gone!

Beyond rockets and science, it’s also quietly shaped by international law. Here are five things you might not know:

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1. Every rocket belongs to a country

Under international law, rockets don’t belong to NASA or astronauts, but to countries.

So, Artemis II is a U.S. space object, which means the U.S. is responsible for it. (Even though the crew includes a Canadian astronaut!)

If something were to go wrong at any point (e.g., damage on Earth or to aircraft in flight), responsibility would fall on the U.S.

2. Outer Space treaty yes, Moon Treaty no

The U.S. signed the Outer Space Treaty (1967) because it says no country can own space or put nuclear weapons there, but it still lets countries explore and use space freely.

The Moon Treaty, which came later (1979), tried to go further by suggesting the Moon’s resources should be internationally controlled and shared with everyone.

The U.S. never signed it because it worried that would limit future missions.

(Artemis II wouldn’t break it anyway as it’s just orbiting the Moon; it’s not landing, mining, or claiming anything. But the U.S. didn’t want to rule out future missions that might do so!)

3. Competition is allowed (sort of)

Artemis II has been described as America’s best effort to beat China in the race to return humans to the Moon.

And international law actually allows strategic or political competition.

The Outer Space Treaty requires the Moon to be used for peaceful purposes.

But that only means that hostile acts, threats of force, and weapons of mass destruction are banned.

Exploration can be peaceful under the law while still serving national goals.

(Whether that should count as peaceful is a debate space law never really settled… What do you all think? Let me know in the comments!)

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4. No one can own the Moon

The goal of Artemis II is to bring NASA one step closer to landing astronauts on the Moon, currently planned for mid-2027.

But under the Outer Space Treaty, no country can claim the Moon.

Even landing, spending time there, or planting a flag (looking at you, Armstrong) doesn’t create ownership.

5. Environmental rules are lagging

Rockets release emissions directly into the upper atmosphere, where they can affect ozone levels and climate systems, and space missions can leave behind debris (i.e. bits of old spacecraft).

Yet the main international space treaties were written before environmental protection became a global legal priority.

So, there are no clear international rules about environmental harm caused by space launches/missions. There’s a gap.

So even though Artemis II might cause environmental damage, there’s little that environmentalists can do about it.

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The UN Just Passed a Slave Trade Resolution: A 2-Minute International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 11:33:58 GMT

Last week, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution about the 400-year-long transatlantic slave trade.

The resolution basically builds a case for reparations based on historical and legal reasons, but stops short of telling certain states to pay up or how – instead encouraging dialogue about it.

123 states voted in favour, 3 against (the U.S., Israel and Argentina) and 52 abstained (see which here).

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3 THINGS THE RESOLUTION SAYS TO BUILD A CASE FOR REPARATIONS

Reparations have historical and legal basis

It says reparations have been provided in other historical contexts. (Hint: Why not this one?)

It lists historical examples where slavery was codified into law to show that it was a state-organized and legally codified system.

It says under international law, reparations are owed following an internationally wrongful act (true).

Slavery broke the highest laws of humanity (jus cogens)

The resolution says that slavery wasn’t just wrong, but it broke the highest laws humanity has (called jus cogens norms).

These aren’t rules countries can opt out of, and no amount of time or political deal-making can wipe the slate clean.

The obligation to make it right is still on the table… and it belongs to everyone, not just those directly involved or affected.

Slavery is the “gravest crime of humanity”

Calling slavery the “gravest crime against humanity” is a bold move; international law usually avoids ranking atrocities against each other.

This is a key reason European countries weren’t happy about the resolution and abstained.

But the resolution makes the case that slavery was uniquely devastating: its sheer scale, how long it lasted, and the fact that its effects are still reshaping lives today set it apart.

The real goal is political: the worse the crime, the stronger the case for real reparations, not just a symbolic ‘sorry’.

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REMAINING CONTROVERSIES

Why didn’t the resolution go further and order reparations?

Making a case and encouraging dialogue is the maximum that could be done given the political sensitivities of the topic.

Why 52 abstentions?

Mostly European states were unhappy about slavery being ranked above other atrocities, but also uneasy about a deeper legal problem:

The rules the resolution invokes (jus cogens, crimes against humanity) didn’t exist when slavery was happening. The EU argument: You can’t really break a law before it’s written.

So the resolution is essentially asking countries to pay up today for something that wasn’t technically illegal at the time… which is a genuinely contested question in international law, and one the resolution sidesteps rather than answers.

What do you think about this argument? Let me know in the comments!

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WHAT IMPACT?

Does the resolution actually bind anyone?

No.

UN General Assembly resolutions aren’t legally binding. They’re recommendations.

So what impact does it have?

Three things.

First, it shapes what countries believe the law requires. In international law, when enough states believe something is legally obligatory and act accordingly, it can harden into binding custom over time. This resolution pushes that process forward.

Second, it raises the political cost of saying no: any state now entering reparations talks does so against a UN-endorsed baseline, which strengthens the hand of countries making claims.

Third, it gives bodies like the African Union and Caribbean Community (who backed the resolution) an official stamp of legitimacy. They can negotiate reparations collectively as a bloc, directly with European states, rather than each country having to make its own individual claim and getting bogged down in legal technicalities.

What happens next?

Nobody is rushing to court! The legal questions are just too messy. Who pays what? How do you calculate it? Can you even apply today’s laws to things that weren’t illegal at the time? What about African states that were themselves involved in the slave trade? What about countries that no longer exist? Which court could take on such a case anyway? These are genuinely hard problems with no clear-cut answer.

What’s more likely is movement on returning stolen cultural artefacts like art, manuscripts, historical objects. The resolution explicitly calls for this and it’s happened recently (e.g., the Benin bronzes, France returning artefacts to Mali). Expect this to be where the real action is in the near term.

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The Iran Deal, Explained: What the U.S. Is Actually Demanding and the Legal Problems With It (3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 08:01:15 GMT

The U.S. handed Iran a 15-point ceasefire deal. Iran rejected it and fired back with a counterproposal. Whether they’re actually negotiating is anyone’s guess.

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But here’s why the U.S. proposal matters anyway: even a rejected deal is a roadmap. It shows exactly where the U.S. stands, what they’re demanding, and how far things have shifted since the last attempt.

To make sense of it, you need three reference points: (i) Obama’s 2015 JCPOA, which traded sanctions relief for nuclear limits; (ii) Trump’s 2018 demands after he tore it up; and (iii) what the U.S. is asking for now, in 2026, with bombs already falling.

(I’m focusing on the U.S. proposal here as it’s more detailed and reveals more about where talks might go. Iran’s counterproposal essentially says ‘stop bombing us, pay reparations and recognise our sovereignty over Hormuz’.)

So, three questions: how have U.S. demands on Iran evolved since 2015? What are the legal problems with the current proposal? And why does any of that actually matter?

How U.S. Demands on Iran Have Escalated (2015–2026):

(It’s table time… I love tables!)

The arc is stark (rhyme unintentional): 2015 was about constraining Iran. 2018 was about dismantling it. 2026 is about making it defenceless.

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(Shoutout to for the tip on presenting this table!)

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Four legal problems with the proposal:

A bilateral deal can’t bind the parties that matter most

The JCPOA involved all five permanent UN Security Council members plus the European Union.

The 2026 proposal might become just a bilateral US-Iran deal… let’s see.

But a bilateral deal can’t legally bind the many third parties most affected by the U.S. demands (shipping nations, neighbouring countries, proxy groups).

So if it’s going to be implemented, other countries have to get involved.

Any deal signed under bombardment may be void

Under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention, a deal signed under pressure of military force is legally void.

Iran is still being bombed, which might create pressure for it to agree to something as it wants the aggression to stop.

This hands Iran a legal exit ramp from any deal it signs… and it knows it.

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“Unrestricted IAEA access” doesn’t legally exist yet

The IAEA (the UN’s nuclear watchdog)’s inspection runs through specific legal instruments, which define exactly what access means and how it works.

None of them allow “full and unrestricted access”, as written in the 2026 ceasefire deal.

So for this to work, Iran would have to sign new legal agreements or change the existing ones with the IAEA. This will take time.

The U.S. and Iran don’t even agree on what law governs the Strait of Hormuz

The U.S. is demanding Iran promise never to close the Strait of Hormuz… forever. In other words: accept that it’s a transit passage strait, which Iran has little to no control over.

Iran’s counterproposal says the U.S. must recognise its sovereignty over Hormuz. In other words: accept that it’s an innocent passage strait, which Iran has much more control over.

I already covered in my last post that they don’t see eye to eye on what laws govern the Strait, and are both invoking a rulebook neither has signed on to. So it’s unlikely that this point will be resolved.

Why do the legal issues matter here?

Ceasefire deals can sound decisive. But they only last if political demands become workable legal obligations.

When that doesn’t happen because of legal problems, agreements may look strong… then fall apart.

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The US-Israel-Iran War Has Been Ugly. Here's What International Law Says (in 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:02:34 GMT

International law doesn’t just regulate whether you go to war. It regulates how you fight.

And this fight has been ugly. Here’s what the law says.

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1. Targeting Energy Infrastructure

Israel struck large fuel storage tanks in Tehran, causing immediate shortages.

The U.S. bombed Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal, handling roughly 90-95% of all Iranian crude exports.

Iran has targeted energy infrastructure in Israel and neighbouring countries in return.

Trump threatened to obliterate Iranian power plants within 48 hours if Iran didn’t reopen the Strait of Hormuz (...then backed down hours later, saying the two sides are holding “productive conversations.”)

The logic is simple: cut the fuel, and you cripple the military (jets, tanks, and missiles all run on it). Cut the oil revenue, and you strangle the economy (yup… we’re all cooked!). And when civilians can’t heat their homes, move food, or keep hospitals running, pressure on governments rises fast.

The International Red Cross has been clear: Energy infrastructure is part of civilian infrastructure, and attacking it is prohibited unless it qualifies as a military target.

And even then, the anticipated civilian harm (fuel scarcity, loss of heat, hospital outages) can’t be disproportionate to the military advantage gained. Economic or political benefits don’t count.

Collective punishment is also prohibited: You can’t deliberately harm an entire civilian population to pressure its government.

2. All parties are killing civilians

Israel’s strikes on Tehran’s fuel storage tanks triggered toxic ‘black rain’: oil-saturated rainfall that poisons water supplies, damages crops, and causes serious breathing problems.

Israel used white phosphorus in residential areas of southern Lebanon. It burns through skin and bone and cannot be extinguished. The injuries are devastating, often fatal.

Both sides have been killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure (e.g., schools, hotels, apartment buildings, hospitals, historical landmarks) in Iran, Lebanon, Israel, and neighbouring countries.

All of this violates the core rules of warfare:

Distinction: you must tell civilians and military targets apart, and only hit military targets.

Precaution: you must take all feasible steps to avoid civilian harm.

Proportionality: you can’t cause massive civilian harm to achieve a minor military goal.

And if you’re not sure whether a target is military or civilian, you must assume it’s civilian. If it’s used for both, it can only be attacked if it is genuinely helping military operations.

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3. Are Israel/U.S./Iran bound to these rules?

Yes.

The Geneva Conventions (that all are parties to) protect civilians and hospitals.

But the specific rules of distinction, precaution, and proportionality are most clearly codified in Additional Protocol I. The U.S./Israel/Iran aren’t parties to that.

White phosphorus in civilian areas is addressed by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, a treaty neither the U.S. nor Israel is party to.

But these rules are so widely accepted that they bind everyone, treaty or not.

Iran isn’t off the hook, by the way. Who started the conflict is a separate legal question from how it’s conducted. Once at war, the laws of warfare bind everyone equally: aggressor and defender alike.

And there is no lawful “tit for tat”: What the other side did first is never a legal justification to do the same.

4. Who can be held accountable?

Military commanders and heads of state can be prosecuted.

(Heads of state often claim immunity though, so getting them into a courtroom is a different matter entirely…)

The charges would likely be war crimes and crimes against humanity.

War crimes are specific prohibited acts during war time, e.g., hitting a hospital, using white phosphorus in civilian areas, deliberately killing civilians. A single strike can qualify.

Crimes against humanity are bigger: either a large-scale attack on a civilian population, or a systematic pattern of them (not a one-off).

The same act can be both crimes simultaneously.

The main venue for prosecution is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The problem: none of the relevant parties (U.S., Israel, Iran, Lebanon) are members.

Iran or Lebanon could join the ICC and trigger investigations into U.S. and Israeli conduct on their soil.

This would be a bold move as U.S. law allows the President to use ‘all means necessary’ to free U.S. or allied personnel from ICC custody in The Hague (yes, really), and the U.S. is actively crippling it as we speak over its arrest warrants on Israeli leaders. On top of that, joining would expose Iran/Lebanon’s own conduct to scrutiny too. So, not impossible, but a lot to swallow.

Beyond the ICC: Some countries allow their courts to prosecute serious crimes no matter where they happened or who committed them. It’s rare, but it’s real… and it means a U.S., Israeli or Iranian military commander could theoretically be arrested the moment they land in the wrong country.

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The Strait of Hormuz: A 3-Minute International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 08:01:10 GMT

Following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran in February 2026, Iran has restricted the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil passes.

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Can Iran restrict the Strait of Hormuz?

Legally, no. But Iran has enough legal ambiguity to make life very difficult for ships that try to pass.

Most of the Strait sits within Iran’s territorial waters. What Iran can and can’t do with those waters is governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — but Iran isn’t a party to that.

Here’s the thing though. In international law, some rules are so widespread they become universal — binding on everyone, treaty or not. So the real question is: are the rules stopping Iran from closing the Strait universal ones?

That depends entirely on which rules we’re talking about — and this is where it gets interesting.

Geographically, the Strait of Hormuz is clearly what’s called a transit passage strait: it connects two open seas, has no alternative route, and is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Under transit passage rules, other countries have an almost unrestricted right to sail and fly through. Iran can barely interfere at all.

So instead, Iran argues it’s an innocent passage strait (typically a dead-end strait or one with an alternative route) — which gives it significantly more control over who gets through and on what terms. The innocent passage rule is old enough to count as a universal rule, meaning it binds Iran whether it signed UNCLOS or not.

It’s a clever legal manoeuvre. Iran is essentially rejecting the rules that match the geographic reality of the Strait, and substituting older rules that happen to suit it better — rules that are harder to challenge precisely because they’re so well established.

The U.S. has long argued that Hormuz is a transit passage strait, and that transit passage rules have also become universal by now. But that second part is genuinely contested. So until it’s settled, Iran has just enough legal cover to keep making its argument.

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So who’s right: Iran or the U.S.?

The U.S. is right about the geography (Hormuz is a transit passage strait). Iran is right about which rules are universal (innocent passage, not transit passage). But neither is being fully straight with you:

The U.S. is also not a party to UNCLOS.

So the U.S. is arguing that transit passage has become universal and binds Iran. But if that’s true, the same logic binds the U.S. too.

The US is essentially invoking a rulebook it also refused to sign, just to reach a different conclusion to Iran.

Iran’s allowing some countries‘ ships through and blocking others. Can it?

Not by nationality.

But under innocent passage, Iran can block individual ships it deems a security threat, which in practice amounts to much the same thing.

Is Iran’s ship attacks in the Strait legal self-defence against the US-Israel strikes?

Partly.

Iran was attacked first, so it has a legitimate self-defence claim against the U.S. and Israel.

But self-defence must be proportionate and directed at your attacker.

The moment Iran starts attacking neutral vessels from countries with no involvement in the conflict, it crosses from legitimate self-defence into unlawful conduct.

Are Iran’s attacks on ships legal under rules of warfare?

Iran can only lawfully target ships directly contributing to the enemy’s war effort, e.g.: a tanker carrying fuel specifically for the U.S. or Israeli military.

Everything else (e.g., neutral vessels, commercial ships, tankers carrying oil for civilian use regardless of destination) is off limits.

The media’s calling this a blockade. Is it?

No.

A blockade in international law has a specific meaning: the effective prevention of all vessels from accessing an enemy’s coastline.

‘Effective’ is the key word.

A legal blockade has to actually work. If ships are still getting through, it doesn’t qualify.

Without a valid blockade, Iran has no legal authority to stop and search neutral vessels.

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Iran may have laid mines (i.e. planted underwater bombs in) the Strait of Hormuz. Can it legally do that?

No.

These are indiscriminate, i.e., they can’t tell a military vessel from a neutral tanker and just blow up whatever passes over them.

This violates the basic rules of warfare: you must be able to distinguish between military targets and civilian ones, take precautions to minimise civilian harm, and ensure the harm caused is proportionate to the military gain. Mines fail all three tests.

U.S. allies have rejected Trump’s call for help. Are they required to help the U.S. keep the Strait open?

Unlikely.

Other countries can only lawfully help the U.S. through collective self-defence: coming to the rescue of an ally under attack. But two things make that difficult here.

First, any U.S. self-defence rights only kick in after an 'armed attack' — and not every attack qualifies. The threshold is higher than it sounds, and Iran’s attacks on vessels may not clear it.

Second, self-defence is only available to the party that didn’t start the fight.

If Iran’s actions in the Strait are a response to the U.S.-Israel strikes, the U.S. can’t cleanly invoke self-defence… and any country joining it would risk being seen as part of the U.S.-Israeli continued aggression instead. No thanks.

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The U.S. Goes to Court To Defend Israel Against Genocide Charges (in 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 16 Mar 2026 08:01:32 GMT

Four more countries just showed up to the world’s most watched court case: Namibia, Hungary and Fiji and… the U.S.!

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What’s the South Africa v. Israel case?

In December 2023, South Africa sued Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ): the world’s top court for disputes between countries.

It accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza in violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

That’s a treaty that 153 countries have formally committed to (including both South Africa and Israel) that outlaws genocide and requires every member to prevent it.

What are “interventions”?

While the Court works through the case, other countries can formally weigh in.

There are two ways to do it, but the relevant one here is Article 63: if a case turns on how to interpret a treaty, any country that is party to that treaty has the right to jump in and declare they want to explain what they think the treaty means.

Crucially, if a state gets to explain, the Court’s interpretation in its judgment will be equally binding on them — so they have real skin in the game.

Why are these interventions a big deal?

First, the case has become one of the most closely watched disputes ever heard by the ICJ.

Second, 22 countries so far – including the U.S. – have intervened… which is extraordinary!

Historically, interventions were rare and dry… and with one intervenor per case, at best.

Now they’ve become a way for multiple countries to signal who they support politically, and publicly plant their flag.

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What are the 22 countries saying?

The ICJ doesn’t find genocide easily. Across the entire Yugoslav conflict — years of war, hundreds of thousands dead — it found genocide in just one place: Srebrenica. And even that single finding, in Bosnia v. Serbia (2007), came with a sting: the Court refused to hold Serbia responsible for it. In Croatia v. Serbia (2015), it found no genocide at all. Both outcomes were widely criticised.

So what’s at stake with these 22 interventions is essentially: how easy or hard should it be to prove genocide happened in Gaza?

18 are siding with South Africa.

Their arguments broadly push the Court toward a more expansive reading of the Convention — e.g.: assess intent holistically, not act by act; recognise that children’s particular vulnerability lowers the harm threshold; and don’t make this impossibly difficult to prove.

The message, broadly, is: the Convention exists to protect people. Use it.

4 are siding with Israel: the USA, Hungary, Fiji and Paraguay (Paraguay says its neutral, but its legal arguments are pro-Israel)

Their arguments push the opposite way — keep the bar high. E.g.: Genocidal intent must be the only reasonable conclusion from the evidence. Civilian casualties in urban warfare don’t prove genocide. Letting this case succeed risks turning every armed conflict into a genocide claim before the ICJ.

The message, broadly, is: genocide is the gravest crime in international law. Don’t dilute it.

The U.S. goes furthest: calling the allegations simply false, framing them as part of a long-running effort to undermine Israel, and reminding the Court that the U.S. helped write the Convention, so its interpretation should carry weight.

Is it a good thing that they’ve intervened?

Politically, yes. It signals that this is an issue the world is watching, and puts states’ views on the record for history.

Procedurally, it’s more complicated. More interveners means more written submissions, more arguments for the Court to work through, and more time. And while the lawyers argue, Gazans are still dying.

What next for the 22 interveners?

They’ve filed their declarations saying they want to intervene. The Court will decide whether to let each one go further.

If admitted, interveners get to file fuller legal arguments later in the process, and may get to speak at the main hearings too — though that’s the Court’s call.

Neither South Africa nor Israel is obliged to engage with any of it... But both have every incentive to lean on the interventions that help them and push back on the ones that don’t.

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What next for South Africa and Israel?

The case is now grinding through the full legal process: South Africa filed its main written arguments in October 2024, and Israel filed its counter-arguments on 12 March 2026.

South Africa has the right to reply to Israel (and probably will), and Israel the right to reply to South Africa’s reply (so we should expect that!).

After that, oral hearings will take place.

A final ruling is still years away — 2028 is my guess.

Will the ICJ say Israel has committed genocide in Gaza?

Maybe, maybe not.

But worth noting: the Court is simultaneously dealing with another genocide case — whether Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya.

That judgment will likely come first, and the way the Court reasons through it will be a strong signal of how it might approach this one.

(A few of the same countries have intervened in that case too.)

Stay tuned!

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10 Days, 10 Issues: The International Law of the US-Israel-Iran War (in 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 09 Mar 2026 08:02:50 GMT

Struggling to keep up with what’s unfolding? Me too. Here are 10 legal issues to know from the first 10 days of war.

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1. US/Israel’s legal justifications don’t hold up

A state can pre-emptively defend itself against an imminent attack under international law.

The US said Iran has “been an imminent threat for 47 years” — but nothing can be imminent for 47 years.

It also claimed it struck Iran pre-emptively to stop Iran retaliating against Israel — but that’s legally nonsensical, since the “imminent threat” was Iran’s response to an attack the US itself was planning. It’s the equivalent of punching someone to stop them punching you back for a punch you haven’t thrown yet. The US then publicly contradicted this justification.

Israel also said it has the right to defend itself — but with no imminent attack, it doesn’t.

2. Iran’s retaliation spilled over into attacking its own neighbours

Iran struck what it called “legitimate targets” in neighbouring Gulf states — but rather than limiting itself to US military bases, it hit civilian infrastructure like hotels and airports.

This took its response well beyond lawful self-defence, effectively making Iran the aggressor against the Gulf states themselves.

Those countries now have their own right to strike back — provided they do so proportionately.

3. Other Western countries’ roles

Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and Spain called the strikes illegal (yay!).

Germany backed the strikes in words but quietly withdrew its own troops from the region.

Canada supported “with regret.”

France criticised the strikes publicly but sent anti-missile systems to Cyprus to defend against Iranian attacks.

The UK stayed out of direct strikes but allowed the US to use its bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia — possibly lawful only if those bases aren’t being used to attack Iran (though some would disagree).

Using Diego Garcia also sits uncomfortably with the International Court of Justice’s opinion that it belongs to Mauritius and a UK-Mauritius deal to hand it over that has yet to be finalised. Awkward.

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4. Hezbollah’s involvement

After Khamenei’s killing, Hezbollah — an Iranian-backed armed group based in Lebanon — fired at Israel.

Israel struck back and launched a ground invasion of Lebanon.

Hezbollah would argue it was defending its ally Iran.

But even if Israel had a legal basis to retaliate, a full ground invasion goes far beyond what international law allows in self-defence.

5. Rules of warfare haven’t been respected

Civilians and civilian infrastructure (e.g., hospitals, schools, historical landmarks) have been hit by both sides.

The US bombed an Iranian girls’ school twice.

Iran — not a party to the Cluster Munitions Convention — used cluster munitions against Israel, still explicitly prohibited under the laws of warfare.

These could constitute war crimes if intent can be proven.

None of the main parties — US, Israel, Iran, Lebanon — are members of the International Criminal Court, making accountability difficult. But domestic accountability is still an option.

6. The war expands globally

A stray Iranian missile entered Turkish airspace on 4 March and NATO shot it down (Turkey is a NATO member). A repeat incident might drag all 32 NATO countries into the war.

A US submarine sank an Iranian warship off Sri Lanka.

Iran fired drones into Azerbaijan.

Ukraine offered its drone-interception expertise to Gulf states (joining the anti-Iran side).

The conflict is no longer contained to the Middle East – and the more countries drawn in, the harder it becomes to apply international law consistently.

7. Iran apologises to its neighbours

Iran apologised to neighbouring Gulf states for its strikes and pledged not to repeat them unless attacked first — both recognised forms of legal reparation under international law.

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8. The Strait of Hormuz

Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil passes (so, prepare for higher energy bills!).

Whether it can lawfully restrict the Strait and attack other ships is covered in a separate post here.

9. The new Iranian leader and illegal threats against him

Mojtaba Khamenei has been named as Iran’s new leader.

But the US has said it must approve of the new leader or he’ll suffer the same fate as Khamenei.

This is a direct violation of the UN Charter’s non-intervention principle (Article 2(7)) — a state cannot dictate another’s leadership under threat of force.

10. Next steps

Trump demands “unconditional surrender” from Iran and said he’d get boots on the ground if necessary. Iran says bring it on.

This would open an entirely new chapter of legal violations. Watch this space.

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Was Killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Lawful Under International Law? (In 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Sun, 01 Mar 2026 17:41:17 GMT

It’s been an eventful weekend.

Iran was ruled by the Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei for decades, until he was killed by U.S./Israeli strikes. Was this lawful?

International law looks at a killing like this through three different rulebooks:

(1) Use of force: When countries can legally attack;

(2) Rules of warfare: How wars must be fought;

(3) Human rights law: Protections against unlawful killing.

Each protects something different: global peace (1), civilians in war (2), and the right to life (3).

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Under the use of force: unlawful

The missile that killed Khamenei was itself a use of force.

As I explained in my last post, the U.S./Israeli strikes were not justified under international law.

Because the use of force was unlawful, so was the killing.

Under the rules of warfare: unlawful

In war, a leader who commands armed forces can be a lawful target. Khamenei was Iran’s Commander-in-Chief, so he could be targeted.

But even lawful targets must be attacked lawfully:

(i) Distinction: Don’t target civilians.

(ii) Proportionality: Civilian harm can’t be excessive.

(iii) Precautions: Minimise civilian harm.

Reports suggest the strikes damaged civilian sites, including a school. So even if hitting Khamenei may have been allowed, the way it was done likely violated the laws of war.

Under International human rights law: unlawful

Human rights law protects people from arbitrary killing (Article 6 ICCPR), in peace and war.

A state is responsible if its actions — like an airstrike — directly and foreseeably cause someone’s death, even abroad (UN report, at para. 63).

The (very strict!) exception: if the killing is strictly necessary to stop an immediate threat to life.

Some might argue Khamenei posed an immediate threat to Iranian civilians. But conditions must be met (UN report, at para. 12) — some are:

(i) Immediacy: The threat must be imminent. Ongoing repression over months counts as “ongoing harm,” not imminent (even if morally the distinction feels counterintuitive!).

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(ii) Necessity: Killing must be the only way to protect life. The U.S. could have used ongoing nuclear deal negotiations to press Iran to stop repression, or capture him as he did Maduro.

(iii) Proportionality: The harm caused cannot exceed the threat. Killing Khamenei triggered large-scale conflict far beyond any danger to Iranian civilians.

Because these conditions aren’t all met, the strike would likely count as an illegal extrajudicial killing.

(If you have different views, I’d love to hear them in the comments!)

Conclusion: Unlawful

Killing Khamenei was not lawful under international law.

*NOTE: I acknowledge that many Iranian civilians suffered grievously under his regime for decades and have discussed it in a previous post. But this highlights a limitation of international law: it does not always provide effective enforcement tools to protect people. This must be remedied sooner rather than later.

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UPDATE: The U.S. and Israel Strike Iran — New Developments

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Sat, 28 Feb 2026 13:51:38 GMT

Apologies for the multiple posts in one day, dear subscribers!

This morning’s post (“The U.S. and Israel Strike Iran: A 2-Minute International Law Breakdown”) was based on information available at 7am UK time.

Since then, new facts have emerged that materially change section 2 on Iran’s response.

I’ve updated the original post to reflect these developments.

You can read the revised version here.

As this story continues to evolve, I’ll provide further updates if necessary.

Thanks for reading and for your support!

Yusra