SAIL: Iran, Israel & the Middle East

Can Mamdani Arrest Netanyahu in New York? (In 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Wed, 22 Jul 2026 08:18:31 GMT

New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani has been repeatedly saying he will order the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he comes to New York.

Netanyahu travels to New York every September to address the United Nations General Assembly (check out his 2025 intervention here, where many diplomats left the room in protest).

Yet, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for him in 2024.

The ICC is a permanent international tribunal based in The Hague, created by the Rome Statute, a treaty with 125 state parties (i.e., countries that have agreed to be bound by its terms).

It prosecutes individuals accused of the gravest international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

An arrest warrant from the ICC means that any state party to the Rome Statute is legally obligated to detain and transfer the named individual to The Hague if that person enters its territory (see Rome Statute, Article 89(1)).

But could Mayor Mamdani actually have him arrested?

… Honestly, probably not.

The U.S. is not a state party to the Rome Statute (Bill Clinton signed it on 31 Dec 2000 to show the U.S. wanted to join, but the country never completed the official approval process to make it legally binding).

U.S. officials aren’t legally required to enforce ICC arrest warrants; cooperation would be a political choice, not a legal duty.

But even if Mayor Mamdani wanted to arrest Netanyahu, U.S. federal authorities would probably step in to prevent it.

They’d say (and I’m no expert in U.S. law) that foreign relations and international law are federal responsibilities (see e.g., U.S. Constitution Article I Section 8 and Article II Sections 2 & 3).

So, any ICC-related arrest would need federal law enforcement and government approval, not a city or state official.

Mamdani knows this. He said “it is clear we do not have the legal authority to execute this warrant”, and is urging the federal government to act.

In other words, he’ll need to convince Trump.

The thing is, the Trump administration literally launched a campaign to dismantle the ICC just the other day, calling it a threat to U.S. sovereignty.

The U.S. also adopted the Hague Invasion Act back in 2001: a law saying the U.S. will invade The Hague if Americans, or those working on behalf of Israel, are arrested, detained, prosecuted or jailed by or on behalf of the ICC (see section 15(3)).

So let’s just say… it will be a serious uphill battle for Mamdani to convince the federal government to arrest Netanyahu.

So what now?

ICC arrest warrants don’t expire. It follows the person everywhere, forever.

Netanyahu cannot travel to any of the 125 Rome Statute countries without risking arrest, and several have already confirmed they would act.

And we could definitely use more world leaders with Mayor Mamdani’s courage and commitment to uphold international law!

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Who Will Rebuild Gaza? (In 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 16 Jul 2026 13:42:39 GMT

The EU just launched a $1 billion fund for Gaza’s reconstruction.

Generous, right?

But there’s a word missing that lawyers are thinking about: reparations!

A donation is an act of goodwill. Someone chooses to give, and the recipient owes gratitude in return.

Reparation is a legal remedy. Someone breached the law, and now owes a debt to repair their wrong. No gratitude required, because it was never a gift.

The outcome is the same (a rebuilt Gaza), but the rationale is different… and that matters.

That difference is why, in March 2026, a group of UN human rights experts explicitly called out the Board of Peace (remember them?!), arguing that any legitimate reconstruction process has to be “reparative” and rights-based.

Still, both reparations and donations towards rebuilding Gaza have been slow and with challenges.

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1. Why reparations aren’t on the table… yet

A few reasons.

First, Israel denies wrongdoing.

It’s been accused of breaking the laws of war, including targeting civilians and civilian buildings on purpose, and hitting targets way out of proportion to any military value they had.

Israel says none of that is true.

Its position is that it acted in lawful self-defence, that it didn’t deliberately target civilians, and that its response was proportionate.

If a court ever ruled that Israel broke the laws of war, and specifically that flattening Gaza’s civilian infrastructure crossed that line, Israel could then be legally required to pay full reparations.

That wouldn’t just mean money. It could mean actually being made to rebuild what it destroyed.

But no court has made that judgment (at least, not yet…).

Second, it’s difficult to hold other states accountable.

Under the law, a state that aids or assists another state’s internationally wrongful act can be held responsible too, but only if it did so knowing its assistance would be used for that wrongful act.

Nicaragua tried exactly this argument against Germany before the International Court of Justice over Germany’s arms exports to Israel.

The Court’s judgment on this is years away, and only targets Germany.

But it would be the first time a third state is held accountable for complicity, and could maybe even be asked to pay reparations for it as a result… which is a big deal.

Third, the courts that could rule on this take years to decide, and even when they do, they can’t force a state to comply.

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Aside from Nicaragua suing Germany, there have been three recent cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ - resolving disputes between countries) touching on Gaza.

One from July 2024 declared Israel’s occupation of Palestine (including Gaza) was illegal, and mentioned reparations were owed. But it’s a non-binding opinion that Israel has ignored.

Another from October 2025 was on Israel’s obligations toward the UN and humanitarian actors operating there. It was also a non-binding opinion, and didn’t touch on reparations.

The third is South Africa’s genocide case against Israel. Contrary to the first two, this one’s a binding judgment. Plus, if Israel were found have committed genocide, reparations could follow. But we’ll have to wait another few years before we know what the ICJ decides!

Beyond the ICJ, the International Criminal Court (another court in The Hague going after individual criminals; not countries) has issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, but reparations only become possible after a conviction, which would be many, many years off (if at all), not least given the ICC’s many other ongoing crises.

2. Gaza might get humanitarian donations… eventually

Even donations have been challenging.

Even though Qatar said it wouldn’t “write the check” for Gaza’s reconstruction (as it has done so in the past) in December 2025, it later changed its tune and pledged $1 billion.

Others like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, pledged similar amounts at the Board of Peace’s inaugural meeting in February 2026.

The EU just opened its wallet, and the US said its goal was to redevelop Gaza.

But there are some problems:

First, the UN and World Bank put Gaza’s actual reconstruction cost at roughly $71.4 billion over a decade, so the pledges made so far aren’t anywhere near enough.

Second, according to some media reports, the World Bank-administered Gaza fund has received zero dollars from anyone as of mid-2026.

Third, Israel has not made a financial pledge to the Board of Peace’s Gaza reconstruction fund.

The takeaway: Things need to move much, much faster, and political pressure is needed to hold relevant countries to account. What do you think? Comment below.

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The 14-Point Iran-US Deal: An International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:14:31 GMT

A quick summary of this Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)’s points, with international law commentary:

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1. Stop fighting forever: Both sides end the war immediately, stop attacking, and respect Lebanon’s borders

Problem: Israel is still attacking Lebanon.

Since Israel hasn’t signed this deal, it has no legal obligation to stop. The US promised Iran an outcome it can’t actually compel Israel to deliver.

Also relevant: Israel’s conduct in Lebanon is actually governed by the bilateral Israel-Lebanon ceasefire implemented on 3 June 2026, which says Israel has the right to act ‘in self-defense at any time against planned, imminent or ongoing attacks’. So it can claim self-defense and keep attacking.

So this specific MoU clause is hollow until at least one of the following happens:

(a) The binding UN Security Council resolution promised in clause 14 below imposes obligations on Israel directly;

(b) Another agreement on this specific point is signed between the US, Iran, Israel and Lebanon;

2. Respect each other’s independence: No interfering in each other’s internal affairs

This is a core international law under Article 2(7) UN Charter. Good.

3. Aim to reach a final deal within 60 days (unless both agree to extend)

The final deal will (most probably) be a legally binding treaty, but this MoU isn’t. So, if either side breaches it in the next 60 days, there’s no formal enforcement mechanism… just the threat of Iran walking away or the US resuming sanctions or strikes. It’s as fragile as their previous ceasefire deal was.

4. US lifts naval blockade within 30 days

Good. The naval blockade was legally questionable anyway (as covered in another SAIL post).

5. Strait of Hormuz reopens

Iran will let ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz for free for 60 days, get it fully back to normal within 30 days, and will later talk with Gulf countries about how to manage the Strait long-term

This doesn’t clarify anything about the legal status of the Strait, i.e., how much control Iran can have over it (I covered the issue here).Will likely be left to later negotiations.

The ‘passing for free’ part is also awkward because international law doesn’t let countries charge ships simply for passing through an international strait. This is the only part of this MoU that isn’t as international law-compliant, in my view.

6. The US and partner countries will set up at least $300 billion to help rebuild Iran

This doesn’t read as the US paying reparations under international law for invading Iran, and it’s carefully drafted to avoid those optics.

It reads more like a political inducement or economic ‘carrot’ to get Iran to sign and respect the deal.

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7. All sanctions on Iran are eventually lifted

The US agrees to eventually remove all sanctions on Iran (including UN ones) on a timeline to be worked out in the final deal.

Obama’s deal (JCPOA) only lifted nuclear-related sanctions, leaving others (e.g., missile, terrorism, human rights) in place, while Trump seems to be lifting it all (?).

Obama also put mechanics in place: a snapback mechanism letting US, UK, China, Russia, France or Germany reimpose them unilaterally within 30 days of a violation by Iran. Trump doesn’t have one yet… but might in 60 days’ time.

8. Iran won’t build nukes

Iran’s existing stockpile of enriched uranium will be diluted under international inspection. Bigger questions (like whether Iran can keep enriching uranium at all) get settled in the final deal.

This principle is recycled from Obama’s deal, but more vague… likely leaving the actual cap, percentage, and duration to be negotiated within the 60-day window.

9. Freeze things for now

Until the final deal, Iran keeps its nuclear programme as-is (no expansion), and the US won’t add new sanctions or send more troops to the region.

Typical for a temporary MoU of this nature.

10. Allow Iranian oil exports

The US will immediately let Iran export oil and related products/services again, upon signing, before any nuclear steps are verified.

Obama’s Iran deal removed oil sanctions only after Iran completed specific dismantlement steps.

11. The US will release Iran’s money

Iran can actually use its frozen funds and assets now.

Obama’s deal only unfroze Iran’s money after inspectors confirmed Iran had actually scaled back its nuclear programme.

This time, Iran gets its money back first, while the nuclear rules are still being worked out.

12. Set up a system to make sure both sides follow the deal

That will likely be some kind of political/diplomatic body (not a legal institution like a court) made up of representatives from both sides who will monitor the situation.

13. Negotiate the rest after early steps start

Israel stops war in Lebanon. US lifts the naval blockade, lets Iran export oil and unlocks Iran’s frozen funds. Iran reopens Hormuz. Then phase-two negotiations can start.

14. Final agreement gets approved through a binding UN Security Council resolution.

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Overall thoughts:

(a) The US has given far more than Iran, folks (lifted sanctions, oil export waivers, unfrozen funds, a $300 billion reconstruction plan!). In return, Iran only reaffirmed what it always said (no nuclear weapons) and possibly carries on managing the Strait as it always did. Unless the terms on Iran’s existing enriched uranium stockpile ends up stricter than what Obama secured in 2015, it’s hard to see what this war will actually have achieved for the US…

(b) This is genuine progress and a solid start, but it’s too early to get excited. The real sticking points (sanctions timeline, Iran’s enrichment rights, the future of the Strait of Hormuz), and the Israel-Lebanon situation, are still unresolved. Until those pieces fall into place, this MoU could still collapse.

(c) Largely compliant with international law. There’s been a lot of talk about international being ‘dead’, but this deal is itself an international legal text. Even in the biggest legal blunders, countries still turn back to law to structure the way out. That, for me, is something to celebrate.

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Israel Stopping the Global Sumud Flotilla: An International Law Breakdown (in 4 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 04 May 2026 11:39:01 GMT

[The usual caveats apply: this is a simplified explainer, lawyers disagree on several of these points, and by the time you read this, something may have already changed.]

The Global Sumud Flotilla is a fleet of civilian ships carrying doctors, journalists, activists and politicians from 40+ countries, loaded with food, medicine and baby formula.

It has attempted multiple times to sail to Gaza and break Israel’s naval blockade, and has been intercepted (i.e. stopped, controlled, boarded, searched) by Israel every time (latest episode = April 2026.)

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PART 1: WAS ISRAEL ALLOWED TO STOP THE FLOTILLA?

Not under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

UNCLOS says that no country can board another country’s ship without permission once you’re beyond a country’s coastal waters.

That rule applies whether you’re in the open ocean or, as here, in the waters near Crete.

Israel isn’t a party to UNCLOS, but that rule is so universally practiced and accepted that it binds every country whether they’ve signed the treaty or not.

The Flotilla ships had national flags indicating they belonged to those countries (e.g., Spain, France and Italy) who were furious. Many called it an act of piracy. (Legally, piracy usually involves private actors, not state militaries, so that label is contested.)

But Israel would argue we’re looking at the wrong rulebook. UNCLOS doesn’t apply at all and wartime naval law takes over entirely, because it’s at war with Hamas and running a legal naval blockade of Gaza.

So the question is, under wartime naval law: is there actually a legal blockade? (PART 2) And even if it is… did it handle the flotilla lawfully? (PART 3) Let’s go!

PART 2: IS ISRAEL’S BLOCKADE OF GAZA LEGAL?

A naval blockade is a military operation that stops ships from reaching a coastline.

The logic is simple: if you’re at war with someone, you can cut off their supply lines by sea.

To assess if the blockade is legal, there are two questions: Did Israel have the legal right to impose a blockade to begin with? And even if yes, is it running the blockade legally?

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Did Israel have the right to impose a blockade?

This is disputed.

Blocking Gaza’s coast is using force under international law.

The only two things that can make this use of force legal are UN Security Council approval or self-defence.

The Security Council didn’t sign off on Israel’s blockade, but Israel says it’s acting in self-defense against Hamas’ October 7 and years of prior attacks.

It’s supported by one 2011 UN report saying the blockade is ‘a legitimate security measure to prevent weapons entering Gaza’.

The catch: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) said you can’t be both the occupier and claim you’re defending yourself against the people you’re occupying… and also said Gaza is occupied Palestinian territory. That contradiction is Israel’s core problem.

Even if yes, is Israel running the blockade legally?

Unlikely.

A legally-run blockade must meet five conditions: publicly declared, consistently enforced to all ships, during an inter-state war, must not starve civilians, and must allow humanitarian aid through. Miss any one and it’s illegal. The first two aren’t the main controversy. The last three are tricky for Israel.

During an inter-state war:

The 2011 UN report says Hamas functions enough like a state to trigger the laws of inter-state war. Critics reject this argument. They also say Gaza is illegally occupied by Israel and you can’t be at war with/blockade territory you occupy. No inter-state war = no blockade.

Must not starve civilians:

The UN, World Health Organization, Amnesty International and others have all said Gaza’s civilian population has faced famine conditions as a direct result of the blockade.

Starvation as a war crime is being investigated by the International Criminal Court and the UN and EU say the blockade is collective punishment (a war crime). It also feeds directly into the genocide case South Africa has brought against Israel.

Israel says the famine is fake news.

Must allow humanitarian aid through:

Israel says the flotilla was a Hamas operation, there was no humanitarian gap justifying it, and it was actually carrying drugs and condoms.

The UN Security Council and the ICJ have told Israel to stop blocking humanitarian aid.

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PART 3: DID ISRAEL LAWFULLY INTERCEPT THE FLOTILLA UNDER WARTIME NAVAL LAW?

We established in Part 1 that under UNCLOS, Israel had no right to intercept the flotilla. But even accepting the argument that wartime naval law applies instead, the conclusion’s… probably the same.

First off, under wartime naval law, if there’s no legal blockade then any interception of the flotilla is unlawful. Full stop. If that’s your position, you can stop reading and mosey on with your day (hit that ‘Like’ button first, though! 😄)

But even a legal blockade doesn’t give Israel a blank cheque! It still has to intercept correctly. That means no intercepting humanitarian ships, no harming people onboard, humane treatment of anyone detained and no intercepting from an unreasonable distance.

No intercepting humanitarian ships:

You can stop ships trying to breach your blockade, unless they’re on a humanitarian mission, in which case they’re completely exempt and can’t be touched. Israel says it isn’t humanitarian, others disagree.

No harming people onboard:

Israel says the operation was conducted peacefully and without casualties. But activists reported being subjected to extreme brutality.

Humane treatment of anyone detained:

Detainees reported Israel was violent and treated them badly. Israel says detainees were unharmed.

No intercepting from an unreasonable distance:

The law doesn’t clearly say what the appropriate distance is, but the 2011 UN report said the 2010 Mavi Marmara interception was 72 miles/133 km too far, while the 2026 interception happened at 600 miles/1111 km!

But Israel says the size of the flotilla (over 100 vessels) justified early interception for safety and security reasons.

More generally Israel also has to follow basic wartime rules like proportionality (meaning the military benefit of stopping the flotilla has to outweigh the harm caused, especially to civilians). Based on the facts, hard to say this was proportionate… but what do you think?

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In brief, my friends:

UNCLOS says no → flotilla interception already unlawful.
Wartime naval law applies → but legality of blockade is contested.
If blockade is legal → must still follow interception rules but likely didn’t → unlawful.

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The Strait of Hormuz II: Answering Your International Law Questions in 3 Minutes

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 20 Apr 2026 07:01:22 GMT

[The usual caveats apply: this is a simplified explainer, lawyers disagree on several of these points, and by the time you read this, something may have already changed.]

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The legal controversies around the Strait of Hormuz matter: they shape what the U.S. and Iran can demand in negotiations, what other countries can push back on, and give you the full picture of the ongoing conflict. So, let’s get into it!

What law(s) govern the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait is governed by the regime of transit passage under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), giving all ships the right to sail through it.

But Iran isn’t a party to UNCLOS, and it’s not 100% clear in international law that transit passage rules are so universal that they apply to Iran regardless.

So Iran says: this doesn’t apply to us.

(I covered this in more depth in a previous post.)

Is Iran violating countries’ freedom of navigation by closing the Strait?

Yes.

Freedom of navigation is a general principle that ships should be able to move freely.

It’s so widely accepted that it almost certainly applies to all countries, whether or not they’ve signed UNCLOS.

There are some maritime zones where restrictions apply, but completely closing an international strait like Hormuz violates this freedom (as well as transit passage rules).

So even if Iran successfully argues “UNCLOS doesn’t bind me, so the transit passage rules don’t apply”, it must still respect the freedom of navigation and let ships pass through the Strait.

People keep saying the Strait of Hormuz is part of ‘international waters’. Is it?

No.

‘International waters’ isn’t a legal term.

The closest term that exists is “high seas” – parts of the world’s oceans that no single country controls (roughly 70% of the Earth’s surface).

But the Strait of Hormuz isn’t in the high seas. It’s clearly in Iran and Oman’s territorial waters.

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Is the U.S. imposing a naval blockade on Iran lawful?

Probably not.

International law allows a country (e.g. the U.S.) to hit back when another country (e.g. Iran) breaks the rules. These are called countermeasures.

But there’s a hard limit: countermeasures can’t involve the use of force.

And parking warships outside someone’s ports to stop ships getting in or out is using force under international law.

The only two things that can make this use of force legal are UN Security Council approval or self-defence.

Neither applies here: the Security Council hasn’t signed off on it, and self-defence only kicks in if the U.S. had actually been attacked.

Most would say closing the Strait doesn’t qualify as an ‘armed attack’, though some disagree.

So the U.S. naval blockade is likely illegal.

Can other countries impacted by the U.S. blockade do anything?

Yes.

Countermeasures can’t be exercised against third parties that haven’t done anything wrong (e.g., the U.S. turning away Indian ships bound for Iran, or oil tankers serving European countries).

The U.S. could be liable to those third countries for any harm caused.

They can formally protest (e.g., summon the U.S. ambassadors) or even negotiate compensation (though getting the U.S. to actually pay up is another matter entirely…).

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Is the way the U.S. naval blockade is being carried out lawful?

Probably not.

Separate from whether the blockade should exist at all, there’s the question of how it’s being enforced. And it’s not looking great here either.

Under the international law rulebook for naval warfare, the U.S. ticks some boxes: it announced the blockade publicly and is applying it impartially to all countries’ ships.

But two problems:

First, a blockade is only a recognised legal tool during armed conflict. But there’s currently a ceasefire in place (i.e. no armed conflict), which raises the question of whether the US can legally use it at all?

Second, Iran’s coastline is 1,100 miles long, the U.S. is operating alone and has asked for help, and it seems like a massive undertaking. That raises questions about whether the blockade meets the legal requirement of effectiveness.

So… the blockade likely isn’t clearly being lawfully carried out either.

The U.S. attacked and captured an Iranian cargo ship trying to get past its blockade of Iran’s ports. Was that lawful?

If the blockade is unlawful (which is likely), neither attacking nor capturing the ship is justified.

For those who argue the blockade is lawful, then capturing it is lawful but attacking it without prior warning isn’t.

Iran wants to charge tolls for ships to pass through the Strait. Is that lawful?

Probably not, but it’s hard to enforce.

UNCLOS explicitly forbids it, but Iran isn’t a party to UNCLOS.

It’s also not 100% clear that this rule on tolls is so universally widely accepted that it applies to Iran regardless.

And unlike the Suez Canal, Panama Canal or Bosphorus, which all have/had their own specific international treaties governing passage and fees, no such treaty exists for the Strait of Hormuz.

How does this all impact the ceasefire?

It puts enormous strain on an already fragile agreement.

Neither side is fully complying: Iran is (still) closing the Strait, the U.S. is imposing a blockade, and each is accusing the other of ceasefire violations. Yikes.

It also highlights why any lasting deal has to resolve the Strait question directly.

Right now the two sides couldn’t be further apart: Iran wants full recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait, the U.S. wants a guarantee it can never be closed again.

Let’s see what happens.

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Five Reasons the US-Iran Ceasefire Is Legally Fragile (in 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 09 Apr 2026 07:01:40 GMT

Trump announced he would pause bombing Iran for two weeks and Iran said it would open the Strait of Hormuz.

Both are gearing up for negotiations mediated by Pakistan.

But literally hours after the announcements, Israel bombed Lebanon and Iran started blocking Hormuz traffic again.

What’s going on? Beyond the obvious geopolitical tensions, this ceasefire is also legally fragile. Here’s how:

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1. The U.S./Iran haven’t committed to identical terms

The US and Iran have both publicly committed to something: a two-week pause, stopping attacks, opening the Strait of Hormuz.

But they haven’t committed to identical terms.

Compare what they actually said:

On the Strait of Hormuz, Trump said “COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING” while Iran said “safe passage via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations”. Those are two different things.

So if Iran blocks ships citing ‘technical limitations’ and the US calls it a breach, it’ll be hard to settle who’s right.

2. The ceasefire isn’t a binding treaty

The ceasefire would be binding if it were a treaty: a written agreement between states.

Instead: separate social media posts saying different things.

3. U.S./Iran haven’t made binding unilateral statements either

Fun international law fact: a country can legally bind itself just by publicly saying it will do something, as long as it intends to be bound by that statement.

But these social media posts are phrased conditionally: “I will do X if you do Y (my action depends on you)”:

The U.S.: “subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz”

Iran: “If attacks against Iran are halted, our Powerful Armed Forces will cease”

A unilateral declaration is ‘I will do X’ unconditionally.

Conditioning on the other side’s performance shows you don’t intend to be legally bound no matter what. These are political commitments, not legal obligations.

So if either side breaks its “promise,” no one can credibly say “you violated international law” because neither side actually accepted a binding legal obligation.

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4. It hasn’t defined what’s allowed in the next two weeks

Can the US resupply its military bases in Qatar?

Can Iran repair bombed power plants and weapons facilities?

Can either side move troops or bring in fresh weapons systems?

Can Israel continue its invasion of southern Lebanon?

Nobody knows, because the parties never agreed on these points.

The result is a pause that exists only as long as neither side decides to start bombing again, making the ceasefire inherently unstable.

5. There’s no ‘referee’

There’s no mechanism to determine when it’s been violated or who violated it first.

No arbitration panel. No monitoring body. No enforcement mechanism.

That means either side can claim the other broke the deal, restart hostilities, and face no consequences…

Ceasefires rely entirely on both sides’ good faith. And I suspect that’ll be in short supply after weeks of bombing each other...

Conclusion

This ‘ceasefire’ is held together by political convenience, not legal obligation. And that makes it extremely fragile.

Next: the Islamabad talks, where the US and Iranian proposals need to be hammered into a single, binding agreement.

Let’s hope for the best.

Stay tuned for more legal breakdowns right here on SAIL.

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Israel’s Occupation of Southern Lebanon: A 3-Minute International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 06 Apr 2026 07:03:11 GMT

Israel launched a ground invasion of Southern Lebanon, targeting the area from its border to the Litani River (~22 miles/35km: huge!).

A country occupies another to control territory for protection or strategic advantage.

Occupation can be lawful or unlawful depending on why and how it’s done.

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Israel’s grounds for occupation are unlawful (why it’s done)

Occupation is lawful only if it’s genuine self-defense or UN Security Council-authorised. Neither applies here cleanly.

After Khamenei’s killing, Hezbollah (Iranian-backed armed group in Lebanon) fired at Israel. Israel struck back and launched a ground invasion of Lebanon.

It’s debatable whether this is even self-defense. Here are the issues:

© SAIL 2026 - Do not reproduce without permission

(Shoutout to for the tip on presenting this table!)

But even if Israel had the right to self-defense, it violates international law by failing two tests:

Necessity: Israel could’ve simply stopped attacking Iran, and Lebanon already banned Hezbollah’s military activities.

Proportionality: A full invasion displacing hundreds of thousands is too big. Striking Hezbollah’s rocket sites or temporarily occupying a narrow border strip would be proportionate.

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Israel’s conduct of occupation is also unlawful (how it’s done)

Even a legal occupation has strict rules: keep it temporary, don’t settle your people there, make no permanent changes.

Israel is breaking all of them because it’s carrying out annexation.

That’s when you’re supposed to be ‘house-sitting’ but you either declare the ‘house’ is yours (de jure annexation), or act like it by remodeling, moving your family in, changing the locks (de facto annexation)… or both.

Israeli Minister Smotrich explicitly declared the Litani River should be Israel’s new border: de jure annexation.

Netanyahu called for a “security zone” even post-war, a policy that would prevent hundreds of thousands of displaced residents from returning home: de facto annexation — and one that has hardened into permanence before, e.g., Israel’s 1982–2000 Southern Lebanon occupation, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank.

Why this matters

The world is distracted by the Iran war and the threat of the Strait of Hormuz closing. But annexation cannot be ignored; it was a primary trigger for WW2. The international system was built specifically to prevent it.

The UN Security Council must demand Israel withdraw (it has done so in the past) and the UN General Assembly can condemn this. It could also ask the International Court of Justice for its opinion, similar to the one it gave in 2024 about Israel’s West Bank occupation.

States must refuse to recognise annexation, condition military aid accordingly, and pressure Israel to pull out.

Letting this succeed tells every territorial aggressor the rules don’t apply when the world looks away.

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The Iran Deal, Explained: What the U.S. Is Actually Demanding and the Legal Problems With It (3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Fri, 27 Mar 2026 08:01:15 GMT

The U.S. handed Iran a 15-point ceasefire deal. Iran rejected it and fired back with a counterproposal. Whether they’re actually negotiating is anyone’s guess.

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But here’s why the U.S. proposal matters anyway: even a rejected deal is a roadmap. It shows exactly where the U.S. stands, what they’re demanding, and how far things have shifted since the last attempt.

To make sense of it, you need three reference points: (i) Obama’s 2015 JCPOA, which traded sanctions relief for nuclear limits; (ii) Trump’s 2018 demands after he tore it up; and (iii) what the U.S. is asking for now, in 2026, with bombs already falling.

(I’m focusing on the U.S. proposal here as it’s more detailed and reveals more about where talks might go. Iran’s counterproposal essentially says ‘stop bombing us, pay reparations and recognise our sovereignty over Hormuz’.)

So, three questions: how have U.S. demands on Iran evolved since 2015? What are the legal problems with the current proposal? And why does any of that actually matter?

How U.S. Demands on Iran Have Escalated (2015–2026):

(It’s table time… I love tables!)

The arc is stark (rhyme unintentional): 2015 was about constraining Iran. 2018 was about dismantling it. 2026 is about making it defenceless.

© SAIL 2026 - Do not reproduce without permission

(Shoutout to for the tip on presenting this table!)

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Four legal problems with the proposal:

A bilateral deal can’t bind the parties that matter most

The JCPOA involved all five permanent UN Security Council members plus the European Union.

The 2026 proposal might become just a bilateral US-Iran deal… let’s see.

But a bilateral deal can’t legally bind the many third parties most affected by the U.S. demands (shipping nations, neighbouring countries, proxy groups).

So if it’s going to be implemented, other countries have to get involved.

Any deal signed under bombardment may be void

Under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention, a deal signed under pressure of military force is legally void.

Iran is still being bombed, which might create pressure for it to agree to something as it wants the aggression to stop.

This hands Iran a legal exit ramp from any deal it signs… and it knows it.

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“Unrestricted IAEA access” doesn’t legally exist yet

The IAEA (the UN’s nuclear watchdog)’s inspection runs through specific legal instruments, which define exactly what access means and how it works.

None of them allow “full and unrestricted access”, as written in the 2026 ceasefire deal.

So for this to work, Iran would have to sign new legal agreements or change the existing ones with the IAEA. This will take time.

The U.S. and Iran don’t even agree on what law governs the Strait of Hormuz

The U.S. is demanding Iran promise never to close the Strait of Hormuz… forever. In other words: accept that it’s a transit passage strait, which Iran has little to no control over.

Iran’s counterproposal says the U.S. must recognise its sovereignty over Hormuz. In other words: accept that it’s an innocent passage strait, which Iran has much more control over.

I already covered in my last post that they don’t see eye to eye on what laws govern the Strait, and are both invoking a rulebook neither has signed on to. So it’s unlikely that this point will be resolved.

Why do the legal issues matter here?

Ceasefire deals can sound decisive. But they only last if political demands become workable legal obligations.

When that doesn’t happen because of legal problems, agreements may look strong… then fall apart.

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The US-Israel-Iran War Has Been Ugly. Here's What International Law Says (in 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:02:34 GMT

International law doesn’t just regulate whether you go to war. It regulates how you fight.

And this fight has been ugly. Here’s what the law says.

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1. Targeting Energy Infrastructure

Israel struck large fuel storage tanks in Tehran, causing immediate shortages.

The U.S. bombed Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal, handling roughly 90-95% of all Iranian crude exports.

Iran has targeted energy infrastructure in Israel and neighbouring countries in return.

Trump threatened to obliterate Iranian power plants within 48 hours if Iran didn’t reopen the Strait of Hormuz (...then backed down hours later, saying the two sides are holding “productive conversations.”)

The logic is simple: cut the fuel, and you cripple the military (jets, tanks, and missiles all run on it). Cut the oil revenue, and you strangle the economy (yup… we’re all cooked!). And when civilians can’t heat their homes, move food, or keep hospitals running, pressure on governments rises fast.

The International Red Cross has been clear: Energy infrastructure is part of civilian infrastructure, and attacking it is prohibited unless it qualifies as a military target.

And even then, the anticipated civilian harm (fuel scarcity, loss of heat, hospital outages) can’t be disproportionate to the military advantage gained. Economic or political benefits don’t count.

Collective punishment is also prohibited: You can’t deliberately harm an entire civilian population to pressure its government.

2. All parties are killing civilians

Israel’s strikes on Tehran’s fuel storage tanks triggered toxic ‘black rain’: oil-saturated rainfall that poisons water supplies, damages crops, and causes serious breathing problems.

Israel used white phosphorus in residential areas of southern Lebanon. It burns through skin and bone and cannot be extinguished. The injuries are devastating, often fatal.

Both sides have been killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure (e.g., schools, hotels, apartment buildings, hospitals, historical landmarks) in Iran, Lebanon, Israel, and neighbouring countries.

All of this violates the core rules of warfare:

Distinction: you must tell civilians and military targets apart, and only hit military targets.

Precaution: you must take all feasible steps to avoid civilian harm.

Proportionality: you can’t cause massive civilian harm to achieve a minor military goal.

And if you’re not sure whether a target is military or civilian, you must assume it’s civilian. If it’s used for both, it can only be attacked if it is genuinely helping military operations.

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3. Are Israel/U.S./Iran bound to these rules?

Yes.

The Geneva Conventions (that all are parties to) protect civilians and hospitals.

But the specific rules of distinction, precaution, and proportionality are most clearly codified in Additional Protocol I. The U.S./Israel/Iran aren’t parties to that.

White phosphorus in civilian areas is addressed by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, a treaty neither the U.S. nor Israel is party to.

But these rules are so widely accepted that they bind everyone, treaty or not.

Iran isn’t off the hook, by the way. Who started the conflict is a separate legal question from how it’s conducted. Once at war, the laws of warfare bind everyone equally: aggressor and defender alike.

And there is no lawful “tit for tat”: What the other side did first is never a legal justification to do the same.

4. Who can be held accountable?

Military commanders and heads of state can be prosecuted.

(Heads of state often claim immunity though, so getting them into a courtroom is a different matter entirely…)

The charges would likely be war crimes and crimes against humanity.

War crimes are specific prohibited acts during war time, e.g., hitting a hospital, using white phosphorus in civilian areas, deliberately killing civilians. A single strike can qualify.

Crimes against humanity are bigger: either a large-scale attack on a civilian population, or a systematic pattern of them (not a one-off).

The same act can be both crimes simultaneously.

The main venue for prosecution is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The problem: none of the relevant parties (U.S., Israel, Iran, Lebanon) are members.

Iran or Lebanon could join the ICC and trigger investigations into U.S. and Israeli conduct on their soil.

This would be a bold move as U.S. law allows the President to use ‘all means necessary’ to free U.S. or allied personnel from ICC custody in The Hague (yes, really), and the U.S. is actively crippling it as we speak over its arrest warrants on Israeli leaders. On top of that, joining would expose Iran/Lebanon’s own conduct to scrutiny too. So, not impossible, but a lot to swallow.

Beyond the ICC: Some countries allow their courts to prosecute serious crimes no matter where they happened or who committed them. It’s rare, but it’s real… and it means a U.S., Israeli or Iranian military commander could theoretically be arrested the moment they land in the wrong country.

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The Strait of Hormuz: A 3-Minute International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 08:01:10 GMT

Following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran in February 2026, Iran has restricted the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil passes.

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Can Iran restrict the Strait of Hormuz?

Legally, no. But Iran has enough legal ambiguity to make life very difficult for ships that try to pass.

Most of the Strait sits within Iran’s territorial waters. What Iran can and can’t do with those waters is governed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — but Iran isn’t a party to that.

Here’s the thing though. In international law, some rules are so widespread they become universal — binding on everyone, treaty or not. So the real question is: are the rules stopping Iran from closing the Strait universal ones?

That depends entirely on which rules we’re talking about — and this is where it gets interesting.

Geographically, the Strait of Hormuz is clearly what’s called a transit passage strait: it connects two open seas, has no alternative route, and is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Under transit passage rules, other countries have an almost unrestricted right to sail and fly through. Iran can barely interfere at all.

So instead, Iran argues it’s an innocent passage strait (typically a dead-end strait or one with an alternative route) — which gives it significantly more control over who gets through and on what terms. The innocent passage rule is old enough to count as a universal rule, meaning it binds Iran whether it signed UNCLOS or not.

It’s a clever legal manoeuvre. Iran is essentially rejecting the rules that match the geographic reality of the Strait, and substituting older rules that happen to suit it better — rules that are harder to challenge precisely because they’re so well established.

The U.S. has long argued that Hormuz is a transit passage strait, and that transit passage rules have also become universal by now. But that second part is genuinely contested. So until it’s settled, Iran has just enough legal cover to keep making its argument.

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So who’s right: Iran or the U.S.?

The U.S. is right about the geography (Hormuz is a transit passage strait). Iran is right about which rules are universal (innocent passage, not transit passage). But neither is being fully straight with you:

The U.S. is also not a party to UNCLOS.

So the U.S. is arguing that transit passage has become universal and binds Iran. But if that’s true, the same logic binds the U.S. too.

The US is essentially invoking a rulebook it also refused to sign, just to reach a different conclusion to Iran.

Iran’s allowing some countries‘ ships through and blocking others. Can it?

Not by nationality.

But under innocent passage, Iran can block individual ships it deems a security threat, which in practice amounts to much the same thing.

Is Iran’s ship attacks in the Strait legal self-defence against the US-Israel strikes?

Partly.

Iran was attacked first, so it has a legitimate self-defence claim against the U.S. and Israel.

But self-defence must be proportionate and directed at your attacker.

The moment Iran starts attacking neutral vessels from countries with no involvement in the conflict, it crosses from legitimate self-defence into unlawful conduct.

Are Iran’s attacks on ships legal under rules of warfare?

Iran can only lawfully target ships directly contributing to the enemy’s war effort, e.g.: a tanker carrying fuel specifically for the U.S. or Israeli military.

Everything else (e.g., neutral vessels, commercial ships, tankers carrying oil for civilian use regardless of destination) is off limits.

The media’s calling this a blockade. Is it?

No.

A blockade in international law has a specific meaning: the effective prevention of all vessels from accessing an enemy’s coastline.

‘Effective’ is the key word.

A legal blockade has to actually work. If ships are still getting through, it doesn’t qualify.

Without a valid blockade, Iran has no legal authority to stop and search neutral vessels.

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Iran may have laid mines (i.e. planted underwater bombs in) the Strait of Hormuz. Can it legally do that?

No.

These are indiscriminate, i.e., they can’t tell a military vessel from a neutral tanker and just blow up whatever passes over them.

This violates the basic rules of warfare: you must be able to distinguish between military targets and civilian ones, take precautions to minimise civilian harm, and ensure the harm caused is proportionate to the military gain. Mines fail all three tests.

U.S. allies have rejected Trump’s call for help. Are they required to help the U.S. keep the Strait open?

Unlikely.

Other countries can only lawfully help the U.S. through collective self-defence: coming to the rescue of an ally under attack. But two things make that difficult here.

First, any U.S. self-defence rights only kick in after an 'armed attack' — and not every attack qualifies. The threshold is higher than it sounds, and Iran’s attacks on vessels may not clear it.

Second, self-defence is only available to the party that didn’t start the fight.

If Iran’s actions in the Strait are a response to the U.S.-Israel strikes, the U.S. can’t cleanly invoke self-defence… and any country joining it would risk being seen as part of the U.S.-Israeli continued aggression instead. No thanks.

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10 Days, 10 Issues: The International Law of the US-Israel-Iran War (in 3 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 09 Mar 2026 08:02:50 GMT

Struggling to keep up with what’s unfolding? Me too. Here are 10 legal issues to know from the first 10 days of war.

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1. US/Israel’s legal justifications don’t hold up

A state can pre-emptively defend itself against an imminent attack under international law.

The US said Iran has “been an imminent threat for 47 years” — but nothing can be imminent for 47 years.

It also claimed it struck Iran pre-emptively to stop Iran retaliating against Israel — but that’s legally nonsensical, since the “imminent threat” was Iran’s response to an attack the US itself was planning. It’s the equivalent of punching someone to stop them punching you back for a punch you haven’t thrown yet. The US then publicly contradicted this justification.

Israel also said it has the right to defend itself — but with no imminent attack, it doesn’t.

2. Iran’s retaliation spilled over into attacking its own neighbours

Iran struck what it called “legitimate targets” in neighbouring Gulf states — but rather than limiting itself to US military bases, it hit civilian infrastructure like hotels and airports.

This took its response well beyond lawful self-defence, effectively making Iran the aggressor against the Gulf states themselves.

Those countries now have their own right to strike back — provided they do so proportionately.

3. Other Western countries’ roles

Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and Spain called the strikes illegal (yay!).

Germany backed the strikes in words but quietly withdrew its own troops from the region.

Canada supported “with regret.”

France criticised the strikes publicly but sent anti-missile systems to Cyprus to defend against Iranian attacks.

The UK stayed out of direct strikes but allowed the US to use its bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia — possibly lawful only if those bases aren’t being used to attack Iran (though some would disagree).

Using Diego Garcia also sits uncomfortably with the International Court of Justice’s opinion that it belongs to Mauritius and a UK-Mauritius deal to hand it over that has yet to be finalised. Awkward.

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4. Hezbollah’s involvement

After Khamenei’s killing, Hezbollah — an Iranian-backed armed group based in Lebanon — fired at Israel.

Israel struck back and launched a ground invasion of Lebanon.

Hezbollah would argue it was defending its ally Iran.

But even if Israel had a legal basis to retaliate, a full ground invasion goes far beyond what international law allows in self-defence.

5. Rules of warfare haven’t been respected

Civilians and civilian infrastructure (e.g., hospitals, schools, historical landmarks) have been hit by both sides.

The US bombed an Iranian girls’ school twice.

Iran — not a party to the Cluster Munitions Convention — used cluster munitions against Israel, still explicitly prohibited under the laws of warfare.

These could constitute war crimes if intent can be proven.

None of the main parties — US, Israel, Iran, Lebanon — are members of the International Criminal Court, making accountability difficult. But domestic accountability is still an option.

6. The war expands globally

A stray Iranian missile entered Turkish airspace on 4 March and NATO shot it down (Turkey is a NATO member). A repeat incident might drag all 32 NATO countries into the war.

A US submarine sank an Iranian warship off Sri Lanka.

Iran fired drones into Azerbaijan.

Ukraine offered its drone-interception expertise to Gulf states (joining the anti-Iran side).

The conflict is no longer contained to the Middle East – and the more countries drawn in, the harder it becomes to apply international law consistently.

7. Iran apologises to its neighbours

Iran apologised to neighbouring Gulf states for its strikes and pledged not to repeat them unless attacked first — both recognised forms of legal reparation under international law.

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8. The Strait of Hormuz

Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil passes (so, prepare for higher energy bills!).

Whether it can lawfully restrict the Strait and attack other ships is covered in a separate post here.

9. The new Iranian leader and illegal threats against him

Mojtaba Khamenei has been named as Iran’s new leader.

But the US has said it must approve of the new leader or he’ll suffer the same fate as Khamenei.

This is a direct violation of the UN Charter’s non-intervention principle (Article 2(7)) — a state cannot dictate another’s leadership under threat of force.

10. Next steps

Trump demands “unconditional surrender” from Iran and said he’d get boots on the ground if necessary. Iran says bring it on.

This would open an entirely new chapter of legal violations. Watch this space.

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Was Killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Lawful Under International Law? (In 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Sun, 01 Mar 2026 17:41:17 GMT

It’s been an eventful weekend.

Iran was ruled by the Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei for decades, until he was killed by U.S./Israeli strikes. Was this lawful?

International law looks at a killing like this through three different rulebooks:

(1) Use of force: When countries can legally attack;

(2) Rules of warfare: How wars must be fought;

(3) Human rights law: Protections against unlawful killing.

Each protects something different: global peace (1), civilians in war (2), and the right to life (3).

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Under the use of force: unlawful

The missile that killed Khamenei was itself a use of force.

As I explained in my last post, the U.S./Israeli strikes were not justified under international law.

Because the use of force was unlawful, so was the killing.

Under the rules of warfare: unlawful

In war, a leader who commands armed forces can be a lawful target. Khamenei was Iran’s Commander-in-Chief, so he could be targeted.

But even lawful targets must be attacked lawfully:

(i) Distinction: Don’t target civilians.

(ii) Proportionality: Civilian harm can’t be excessive.

(iii) Precautions: Minimise civilian harm.

Reports suggest the strikes damaged civilian sites, including a school. So even if hitting Khamenei may have been allowed, the way it was done likely violated the laws of war.

Under International human rights law: unlawful

Human rights law protects people from arbitrary killing (Article 6 ICCPR), in peace and war.

A state is responsible if its actions — like an airstrike — directly and foreseeably cause someone’s death, even abroad (UN report, at para. 63).

The (very strict!) exception: if the killing is strictly necessary to stop an immediate threat to life.

Some might argue Khamenei posed an immediate threat to Iranian civilians. But conditions must be met (UN report, at para. 12) — some are:

(i) Immediacy: The threat must be imminent. Ongoing repression over months counts as “ongoing harm,” not imminent (even if morally the distinction feels counterintuitive!).

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(ii) Necessity: Killing must be the only way to protect life. The U.S. could have used ongoing nuclear deal negotiations to press Iran to stop repression, or capture him as he did Maduro.

(iii) Proportionality: The harm caused cannot exceed the threat. Killing Khamenei triggered large-scale conflict far beyond any danger to Iranian civilians.

Because these conditions aren’t all met, the strike would likely count as an illegal extrajudicial killing.

(If you have different views, I’d love to hear them in the comments!)

Conclusion: Unlawful

Killing Khamenei was not lawful under international law.

*NOTE: I acknowledge that many Iranian civilians suffered grievously under his regime for decades and have discussed it in a previous post. But this highlights a limitation of international law: it does not always provide effective enforcement tools to protect people. This must be remedied sooner rather than later.

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UPDATE: The U.S. and Israel Strike Iran — New Developments

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Sat, 28 Feb 2026 13:51:38 GMT

Apologies for the multiple posts in one day, dear subscribers!

This morning’s post (“The U.S. and Israel Strike Iran: A 2-Minute International Law Breakdown”) was based on information available at 7am UK time.

Since then, new facts have emerged that materially change section 2 on Iran’s response.

I’ve updated the original post to reflect these developments.

You can read the revised version here.

As this story continues to evolve, I’ll provide further updates if necessary.

Thanks for reading and for your support!

Yusra

The U.S. and Israel Strike Iran: A 2-Minute International Law Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Sat, 28 Feb 2026 11:57:56 GMT

Let’s cut to the chase.

This U.S.-Israel strike was blatantly illegal. Here’s why:

No UN Security Council authorisation

A strike can be legal if the U.S./Israel got UN Security Council authorisation first.

They didn’t.

No self-defense

A strike can also be legal if acting in self-defense in response to an attack (in the past).

But Iran hasn’t attacked the United States or Israel recently.

It could also be legal if they were acting in self-defense that anticipates a future imminent attack.

Trump explained he believed there was a terrorist threat and threat of Iran having nuclear weapons, and Israel justified it ‘has the right to defend itself’.

But imminence means the threat that is instant and overwhelming, leaving no choice but to act.

That wasn’t the case here for at least three reasons.

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(1) The fear of Iran having nuclear weapons has existed for many years, and we don’t know for sure whether it does.

(2) Iran has also repeated over the past few weeks that it would retaliate if it were attacked — but not initiate an attack itself.

(3) It doesn’t seem like Iran would even have the ability to attack imminently as Trump said Iran’s nuclear program was ‘obliterated’ following the U.S./Israel strikes in June 2025.

No humanitarian intervention

Trump told the people of Iran: “when we are finished, take over your government, it will be yours to take. This will probably be your only chance for generations”.

Some could take that to mean that the U.S./Israel strike on Iran was also to save the Iranian people following the Iranian government’s crackdown on protests.

But attacking a country to rescue its people from an abusive government is not authorised under international law (at least, not without UN approval).

Iran’s response is illegal under international law

Iran has retaliated by hitting U.S. bases in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain.

If those countries gave consent, it’s legal. But it looks like none of them did.

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain have all released statements condemning Iran’s strikes.

So they’re illegal.

Iran and the U.S./Israel are now officially at war

Under international law, countries are at war as soon as one strikes the other.

This means they have to respect the rules of warfare.

One key rule is not harming civilians or civilian objects (e.g., schools, hospitals).

But the U.S./Israel already bombed a school in Iran…

And Iran bombed a hotel in Dubai, an airport in Kuwait and residential buildings in Bahrain.

What now?

If this is anything like the June 2025 attack (and many other past tensions/incidents between the U.S./Israel and Iran, things will (hopefully) simmer down (?).

There might still be a chance that they’ll go back to the negotiating table to strike a new nuclear deal — after all, Oman reported that talks were going well.

If you want more legal background on U.S./Iran tensions, I’ve written about that here.

I’ve also written about the Iran protests, which are relevant to today’s strike.

Please note: This post is being updated as the story develops!

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What happens if the U.S. strikes Iran? (In 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Fri, 20 Feb 2026 08:01:33 GMT

The U.S. says it may strike Iran if nuclear talks fail.

Here are your top questions answered:

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Can the U.S. strike Iran?

No.

Attacking Iran without UN Security Council authorisation would be unlawful.

“Humanitarian intervention” (attacking to protect Iran’s population) is not an accepted legal basis.

Force is lawful in self-defense only if Iran is imminently attacking the U.S.

That does not appear to be the case here, as the U.S. would be initiating force.

Why might the U.S. strike Iran?

For years, the U.S., UN, and Western states have sanctioned Iran over its nuclear program.

In 2015, Obama helped negotiate the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), limiting Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

But in 2018, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the deal, calling it “insane”.

In 2025, fearing Iran might develop nuclear weapons, Israel and the U.S. coordinated strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

In 2026, the logic is the same: preventing Iran from going nuclear.

Is Iran allowed to have a nuclear program under international law?

Yes, for peaceful use.

Iran is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT allows non-nuclear-weapon states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful use (e.g., energy, medicine) but prohibits nuclear weapons.

Iran enriches uranium (used for bombs) up to 60%, below weapons-grade but close.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (the UN’s nuclear watchdog) has called this concerning.

Iran says Article 4 of the NPT lets it enrich uranium, so long as IAEA inspections can verify it’s for peaceful use.

Is Iran’s program for peaceful use?

Unclear.

Iran limited IAEA inspections in 2025, preventing full verification.

Iran maintains its program is peaceful and accuses the IAEA of bias.

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Is Iran allowed to have nuclear weapons?

No.

Under the NPT, only five states are recognised nuclear powers: the U.S., Russia, China, France, and the UK — and even they are expected to pursue disarmament.

The NPT has 191 members. All others, including Iran, agreed not to build nuclear weapons.

(The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons bans nukes entirely, by the way, but only 74 states have joined… and none of the five recognised nuclear powers (surprise!)).

Why does the U.S. care?

Security and history.

The U.S. and Iran were allies until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when the Khamenei government rejected U.S. influence.

Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, holding diplomats hostage for 444 days.

The U.S. sued and won a case against Iran at the International Court of Justice, and a claims tribunal in The Hague still handles disputes from that period.

With all this bad blood, the U.S. fears a nuclear-armed Iran would spell serious trouble.

Are the current Iran protests relevant?

Yes.

Iran’s protester crackdown and U.S. support for protesters heightened tensions.

Can Iran strike back?

Yes. (And it said it will!)

Under international law, a state may use force in self-defense in response to an attack.

But its response must be temporary (pending UN Security Council involvement), necessary to stop further harm, and proportionate (not excessive).

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5 Legal Problems With Trump’s Board of Peace (in 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Wed, 21 Jan 2026 08:00:34 GMT

After the Israel–Hamas ceasefire, Trump unveiled a peace plan backed by the UN Security Council, setting up a Board of Peace (BoP) to rebuild and stabilise Gaza.

This week, Trump rolled out the BoP’s Charter along with invitations for leaders to join by signing it at Davos this week.

But on closer look, it has some serious international law problems.

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The BoP is not an international organisation

The Charter calls the BoP an international organisation.

It (sort of) looks like one too: it has members, voting rules, membership fees, and even claims its own legal personality.

But calling something an international organisation doesn’t magically make it one.

What actually matters is how it was set up.

True international organisations are built by treaties signed by countries, meaning they collectively agree to give it power and legitimacy.

The BoP, by contrast, was created by a UN Security Council resolution.

That’s why it can’t claim the independence or authority of a genuine international organisation.

In UN practice (here, Article 29), the Security Council can create subsidiary organs (committees, tribunals, or temporary missions), but these are not independent international organisations.

The BoP fits this pattern: it is described by the Council as a ‘temporary administration’, not a treaty-based organisation of states.

The Charter goes beyond its Gaza mandate

The Charter wants the BoP to operate ‘in areas affected or threatened by conflict’… and it doesn’t mention Gaza once!

But because the BoP was created by a Security Council resolution, it exists to carry out that resolution’s objectives.

Its authority is delegated, not original. It can’t redefine or expand its role.

Acting outside its Gaza mandate (ultra vires) would be unlawful.

The Charter says the BoP is “forever” while it’s actually temporary

The Charter says the BoP can shut itself down whenever the Chairman feels like it, or every other year, unless the Chairman decides to keep it going.

But the Security Council Resolution clearly says the BoP only runs until the end of 2027, and any future action must be coordinated with Egypt, Israel, and the other involved states.

A subsidiary body can’t ignore or change the rules set by the Security Council when it was created.

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It’s not even a realistic pretend-international organisation

Never mind that it’s not legally an international organisation — it has three unusual features no real international organisation would have anyway:

First, only States invited by the Chairman can join, giving one person total control and undermining its legitimacy.

Second, members can bypass rules by paying $1 billion (!), a highly unusual and unfair system.

Third, the BoP is extremely centralised, with Trump as lifetime chair and no independent oversight or rotating leadership.

The BoP imposes authority on Palestinians

No Palestinians sit on the BoP.

They are only on the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), which the Board supervises to run day-to-day services.

That means Palestinians are essentially being managed from above, not included in decision-making at the top.

This setup undermines Palestinian self-determination: the right to fully determine their own future.

Takeaway: The Security Council needs to rein in the BoP and fix its credibility problem. Like this post if you agree!

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The Iran Protests Explained in 2 Minutes

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 19 Jan 2026 09:02:36 GMT

What’s the situation?

Iran has been ruled by the Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei since 1989.

He is not directly elected by public vote and holds ultimate power, making Iran an authoritarian system.

Iranians (including women, students, and civil society activists) have protested his rule repeatedly for decades.

The current wave is one of the largest yet and has led to many deaths.

Some foreign governments, including the U.S. and Israel, oppose Khamenei. The U.S. has publicly supported the protests.

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Why are people protesting?

Years of corruption, economic collapse (worsened by UN and Western sanctions), and social controls like compulsory women’s headscarf (hijab).

What began as demands for reform has turned into calls to overthrow Khamenei.

Are the protesters allowed to protest?

Absolutely!

Articles 19 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantee freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

Iran is a party to this human rights treaty, so it’s legally bound to respect these rights.

Can the Iranian government kill protesters?

No.

The ICCPR rights aren’t unlimited; Iran can impose some restrictions on protests for security or order.

But killing peaceful protesters is never allowed.

The same goes for blanket bans, mass arrests and internet shutdowns, by the way.

Can the US or other states help the protesters?

Depends how they’re helping.

Under the principle of non-intervention, foreign states may not fund, arm, or direct opposition groups in another country. (See here, Article 2(7)).

But diplomatic statements, political speeches, and sanctions are allowed.

Can the US and other states sanction Iran?

Yes.

Iran has faced two types of sanctions: UN Security Council sanctions, which all UN members must follow (mainly over its nuclear program), and sanctions that the U.S. and other Western countries have imposed on their own.

Can the US invade Iran on humanitarian grounds?

No.

Attacking another country without UN authorisation is unlawful except in self-defense.

Attacking that country to save its people (i.e. ‘humanitarian intervention’) is not an accepted justification in international law.

The UN Security Council could authorise such an invasion. But this is unlikely as China and Russia would block it with their veto.

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Can the US threaten to invade Iran?

Nope.

Even threatening force is illegal.

What if it invades anyway?

They would likely face serious pushback from countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, who have blocked similar moves before.

Also, Iran has warned it’ll strike back. Gulp.

Can Iranian leaders be tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC)?

Unlikely.

Iran isn’t part of the International Criminal Court (ICC), so the court can’t automatically try its leaders.

The UN Security Council could refer the situation to the ICC, but that is very unlikely because countries like Russia and China would block it. (Sigh.)

Can other countries put Iranian leaders on trial?

Yes, in some cases.

A few countries can try people for serious crimes even if they happened elsewhere.

It’s not easy and usually only works if the suspect is in that country.

For example, victims of Iran’s 2022 protests filed a criminal complaint in Argentina using its laws.

Do Iranian protesters fleeing abroad have legal protection?

Yes.

People fleeing political persecution may qualify for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Peaceful political activism and protest can form the basis for refugee status.

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Israel Recognised Somaliland. Now what? (In 2 minutes)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Thu, 01 Jan 2026 09:00:22 GMT

(Source of image: Somalia/Somaliland: the differences and issues explained | ActionAid UK)

Somaliland is a place in the Horn of Africa that has declared itself an independent country.

But until now, no country formally considered it one.

That changed when Israel recognised Somaliland as a state in December 2025.

So… what does that actually mean in international law?

Let’s break it down.

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Is Somaliland a state?

No (at least not yet, legally speaking).

To figure out what counts as a “state” under international law, people usually point to the Montevideo Convention of 1933, which sets out four criteria for statehood:

a permanent population
a defined territory
a government, and
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.

On paper, Somaliland meets all four.

It has a stable population, controls territory, governs itself, and already engages with other countries.

So if this were just a checklist, Somaliland would pass.

But that’s not how international law works in real life.

States don’t magically pop into existence just because they tick the Montevideo boxes.

In practice, recognition matters more.

Recognition is when one country officially decides to treat another place as a state. Each country makes that decision for itself.

You can meet all the requirements to join a club, but unless the other members accept you, you’re still stuck outside.

Some entities meet all four Montevideo criteria but aren’t recognised, so they remain outside the international system.

Other places are recognised as states even though they don’t perfectly meet the criteria.

So while the Montevideo Convention matters, recognition by other states often carries more weight.

That’s why Somaliland, despite meeting the legal criteria, has mostly been treated as not being a state… until Israel’s move.

What does Israel recognising Somaliland actually change?

Israel and Somaliland recognising each other formalises their relationship and has real legal consequences.

First, diplomatic missions.
Israel can open a mission in Somaliland, and Somaliland can open one in Israel. These become the official channels for communication between the two governments.

Second, diplomatic immunity.
Diplomats posted between the two will receive immunity, meaning they generally can’t be arrested or sued in the host country. Beyond the practical side, immunity is symbolic, signalling recognition of the other as an equal sovereign state.

Third, treaties.
Recognition allows Israel and Somaliland to sign treaties between them as equal sovereign states.

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Will Israel’s recognition make Somaliland a state?

No.

Israel recognising Somaliland means that Somaliland is a state from Israel’s perspective, and Israel’s alone.

There’s no single global switch that flips Somaliland into being a country for everyone.

Each state has to decide whether it recognises Somaliland independently.

So how many recognitions are “enough”?

That’s the frustrating part: international law doesn’t give us a magic number.

Take Palestine as an example. It’s recognised by over 150 countries (roughly three-quarters of the world!) and there’s still debate about its legal status.

So there won’t be a clear moment where Somaliland suddenly becomes “objectively” a state in everyone’s eyes anytime soon…

So why are people worried?

Many countries are not happy about Israel’s move. (Check out Qatar’s scathing statement here!)

One concern is that Israel’s recognition could start a domino effect, encouraging other states to recognise Somaliland too.

That could seriously destabilise the East African region, especially given Somalia’s strong opposition to Somaliland’s independence and the fragile political balance in the Horn of Africa.

Let’s see how this story unfolds…!

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Israel Bombed Qatar, Then Apologised. Here’s the International Law Behind It (in 1 minute)

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 09:01:57 GMT

Last week, Israel and Qatar held a secret New York meeting to rebuild ties after Israel’s September strike in Doha targeting Hamas leaders.

Qatar called the attack a violation of international law, and Israel apologised, taking full responsibility.

Now, the two are set to cooperate on implementing Trump’s UN-backed Gaza peace plan (I’ve broken that down here).

Let’s unpack the international law behind all of this (as always, in plain English).

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Was the attack justified by self-defence?

The golden rule is that no country can attack another country under international law (Article 2(4)).

Self-defence is an exception (Article 51), but it has rules:

Who’s being targeted?

Israel didn’t target Qatar’s government; it went after Hamas. Many legal experts now accept that armed groups can be targeted in self-defence. This point isn’t the most controversial.

Is the host country acting to stop the threat?

If a group like Hamas is in another country, that country must be unwilling or unable to stop it for a strike to be legal.

Qatar could have expelled or arrested Hamas leaders, so it was able.

Qatar was mediating a peace deal between Israel and Hamas, so it wasn’t clearly unwilling.

Qatar insists that it is not funding Hamas.

Was the attack necessary?

Self-defence must be the only feasible way to stop the threat. Since peace talks were underway, other options existed.

Conclusion: The attack was not justified by self-defence.

Does Israel’s apology matter, legally speaking?

Diplomatically, yes; it signals responsibility.

Legally, it’s part of what international law calls “satisfaction,” a way to repair a wrongful act (Article 37(2)).

But an apology doesn’t erase legal responsibility.

Qatar or victims could still ask for compensation or other reparations.

Do you think this should happen? Let me know in the comments below!

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I Read the UN Security Council’s backing of Trump’s Gaza Proposal So You Don’t Have To. A 2-Minute Legal Breakdown

Dr Yusra Suedi (SAIL) — Tue, 18 Nov 2025 00:21:25 GMT

After the Israel–Hamas ceasefire, Donald Trump introduced a peace plan and pushed the UN Security Council (UNSC) to adopt it for international backing. The UNSC just did: 13 of 15 members voted in favour (Algeria, Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, UK, USA), with China and Russia abstaining. Here’s what it says.

So what’s the plan?

A temporary Board of Peace (BoP), led by Trump, will rebuild and stabilize Gaza before handing it back to Palestinian control by 31 December 2027.

After that, a real path toward Palestinian self-determination and statehood could open up.

The BoP has two main goals:

1. Rebuild Gaza

Set up a temporary local government
Oversee reconstruction
Support a neutral team of qualified Palestinian officials to run daily services (civil service and administration)
Facilitate movement in and out of Gaza
Bring aid back into Gaza
Coordinate funding (from countries, World Bank, donors, partners, etc) to rebuild Gaza

2. Stabilize Gaza

Create a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) — an armed peacekeeping force from several countries
Disarm Gaza by permanently destroying Hamas’ weapons and infrastructure
Keep humanitarian corridors open and safe for aid and civilians
Train and support vetted Palestinian police
Protect civilians and maintain peace

Legal issues:

How would this work in practice?

Hamas rejects any plan that includes disarmament, saying it only helps the Israeli occupation, and wants any international force limited to border and ceasefire monitoring.

Israel, on the other hand, objects to the parts about Palestinian self-determination and future statehood.

With both sides unhappy, it’s unclear how the plan can actually hold up legally…

Self-determination:

Should the Palestinians’ right to self-determination (i.e., to decide their own fate) come with conditions or be placed on someone else’s timeline? And is it appropriate to frame it so tentatively, as if it’s only a possibility rather than a commitment?

UNRWA:

The resolution doesn’t mention the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), leaving its role in humanitarian aid unclear, even though the International Court of Justice has said it should be involved (see para. 124).