Four Ways the Next UN Secretary-General Could Actually Strengthen International Law (in 2 minutes)
By Yusra Suedi (PhD, Assistant Professor of International Law at University of Manchester)
You’ve probably heard that campaigning is in full swing to elect the next UN Secretary-General by the end of 2026 (full process explained here).
Four candidates are in the running: Michelle Bachelet (former Chilean president), Rafael Grossi (head of the UN’s nuclear watchdog), Rebeca Grynspan (Costa Rican economist), and Macky Sall (former Senegalese president).
Media coverage is focusing on geopolitics, regional rotation and debates on electing a female SG for the first time (all important!).
But here’s what won’t make headlines: whether the next Secretary-General (SG) will actually strengthen international law… or just keep tweeting about it.
(Yes, I’m calling it ‘tweeting’. Let me have this.)
Here are four ways a bold SG could make a difference.
SG can tell the UN Security Council: “Hey, you need to look at this.”
Article 99 of the UN Charter lets the SG bring issues to the Security Council’s attention, basically saying ‘this is a threat to peace, you need to act’.
It’s seen as confrontational (like the SG saying “I think this is urgent even if you don’t” or “you’re not doing your job properly”) and risky (overstepping into ‘political’ territory, might be ignored, and might irritate the body controlling the SG’s reappointment!).
So it’s only been used a handful of times in 80+ years…
A bold SG could put climate change, pandemics, or AI governance on the Council’s agenda, which could lead to binding resolutions. A timid one won’t.
The SG can waive immunity
UN staff can’t be arrested or prosecuted in the countries where they’re working, for anything they claim was part of their job.
The problem? Crimes like sexual abuse are not a part of their job.
But the UN must decide case-by-case whether to waive immunity… and it rarely does.
So often, accountability is limited.
The SG has the power to waive the immunity for civilian UN staff accused of serious crimes (not military peacekeepers).
A bold SG might do so.
The SG can appoint Special Envoys
The SG can pick and create Special Envoys : high-level diplomats sent to tackle specific problems (e.g., HIV/AIDS, indigenous people, youth) or focus on specific countries/regions (e.g., Syria, Sudan, Haiti) on the SG’s behalf.
So… what about a Special Envoy of International Law?
I’m serious.
Given the state of the world, maybe we need someone who pushes compliance with International Court of Justice judgments, discourages treaty withdrawals, and nudges states to join agreements gathering dust…
Someone who can knock on doors and say “remember those rules you signed up for?”.
The SG can say ‘no’ to powerful countries
Article 100 of the UN Charter protects the SG’s independence: governments aren’t supposed to tell them how to do their job.
This is permission to be bold.
A bold SG uses the powers above despite any pressure or backlash from any government, because Article 100 says they answer only to the UN Charter, not to any government.
Conclusion
Let’s be realistic: the P5 countries (USA, UK, France, China, Russia) largely control the SG’s appointment and reappointment.
An SG who’s a little too bold probably won’t last.
But one who’s too timid won’t matter either… especially now, when the UN is struggling financially, being sidelined diplomatically, and failing to get states to take international law seriously.
We need a SG who understands the risk and takes it anyway. Because international law won’t magically strengthen itself: it needs someone willing to fight for it.




What similarities and differences exist between the role of (proposed) special envoy for international law and the role of existing special rapporteurs on issues related or regarding international law? Appointment process? Thematic or country-level mandates? I presume your proposal for a new role (special envoy) engages directly with sub-pillars of the UN Office of Legal Affairs or lives with principal judicial organ ICJ rather than thematic mandates that Special Rapporteurs are held responsible for?